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WHO CAN “SEIZE THE DAY?”: ANALYZING 
WHO IS AN “EMPLOYEE” FOR PURPOSES 
OF UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING THROUGH THE LENS OF 
THE “NEWSIE” STRIKE OF 1899 
Abstract: In the summer of 1899, the Newsboys of New York banded together, 
formed a union, and began to “strike” against two of the city’s largest newspapers 
in response to a price increase. After a two-week struggle, the newspaper compa-
nies agreed to compromise by buying back any unsold papers at the end of the 
day from the Newsboys. They did not, however, agree to the Newsboys’ classifi-
cation of the effort as a “strike.” The newspapers saw this as a boycott of non-
employees, or independent contractors. After the turn of the century, Congress 
began to pass laws protecting employees, and in 1935 they passed the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which protected employees’ rights to unionize, col-
lectively bargain, and strike. The Newsboys, eager to solidify their rights, argued 
to the Supreme Court in 1944, in NLRB. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., that they 
were in fact employees. Although the Court agreed, Congress did not, and in re-
sponse passed the “Taft-Hartley” amendments to the NLRA. These amendments 
excluded independent contractors from the definition of employee, introducing a 
major issue into the labor realm—how do you differentiate between an independ-
ent contractor and an employee for the purposes of unionization and collective 
bargaining? This Note examines the distinction between employees and inde-
pendent contractors through the case example of the Newsboys and ponders if 
the distinction is necessary or if it merely denies workers’ rights. 
INTRODUCTION 
Jack Kelley, a Newsboy in Lower Manhattan in 1899, and his gang of 
“Newsies” wait to collect the newspapers for them sell for the day when a 
price change forces their hand—“New Newsie Price—sixty cents per hun-
dred.”1 Under the cool lights of Broadway, the Newsies dance and sing across 
                                                                                                                           
 1 NEWSIES (Musical) (Disney 2012) (portraying the Newsboy Strike of 1899 and their movement 
for recognition as a union in a Broadway production) [hereinafter NEWSIES]. The musical is based on 
a Disney movie musical of the same name that came out in 1992, but this Note will focus its refer-
ences on the musical. See NEWSIES (Movie) (Disney 1992) [hereinafter NEWSIES (Movie)] (represent-
ing the first Disney portrayal of the Newsboy Strikes). Most of the Newsies are not real people, with a 
few notable exceptions. Newsies the Musical Study Guide, DISNEY THEATRICAL GRP. EDUC. DEP’T 
11, http://newsiesthemusical.com/pdf/NewsiesStudyGuide.pdf [http://perma.cc/66FQ-DWA6] (ex-
plaining how Disney based its characters on real Newsboys, including “Kid Blink” and “Racetrack 
Higgins”). 
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the stage, all screaming the same word: “strike.”2 Using words of brotherhood, 
their rag tag team of young boys band together to “slay the giant” and win their 
rights as a union.3 With the help of a young, fiery reporter, they go from selling 
the news to being the news.4 After an hour and a half of back and forth with 
Joseph Pulitzer, the owner of the paper, the Newsies emerge victorious, with 
Pulitzer agreeing to buy back any unsold papers at full price at the end of the 
day, and the boys dancing into the new century.5 
Although Jack Kelley never existed (and there was certainly no dancing 
or singing) in the summer of 1899, the Newsboys of New York (“Newsboys”) 
did strike against The Evening World (“The World”) and The Evening Journal 
(“The Journal”).6 Imploring the city, “Please don’t buy The Evening Journal 
and World, because the Newsboys has striked,” the boys caused a ruckus 
through the city and managed to cut down the circulation of these papers from 
about three hundred and sixty thousand to a measly one hundred and twenty-
five thousand.7 There was, however, one very important difference between the 
real Newsboy strike and the Disney Musical version—in the musical, Pulitzer 
eventually met with Jack Kelley as the representative of the Newsboy Union 
and engaged in collective bargaining with him to reach a compromise.8 In the 
real events, while the owners of the papers allowed the boys to sell back all 
unsold papers at the end of the work day in an effort to end the strike, they re-
                                                                                                                           
 2 NEWSIES, supra note 1. All the quotes found in the section headings of this Note are from the 
Disney Musical Newsies. See id. 
 3 Id. (singing “we’ll slay the giant; judgment day is here”). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. Joseph Pulitzer was, in the musical and in real life, the owner of The Evening World (“The 
World”), a newspaper in New York. See id.; Seymour Topping, Biography of Joseph Pulitzer, THE 
PULITZER PRIZE, http://www.pulitzer.org/page/biography-joseph-pulitzer [http://perma.cc/YR2T-
Z7P6] (shortly summarizing the life of Joseph Pulitzer). He is now well known for the famous “Pu-
litzer Prizes,” made in his name and awarded every year for excellency in literature. Topping, supra. 
 6 See DAVID NASAW, CHILDREN OF THE CITY: AT WORK AND AT PLAY 183 (1985) (outlining a 
comprehensive history of the Newsboy Strike of 1899); Newsboys Go on Strike: Want More Profit in 
the Sale of Two Evening Papers, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., July 21, 1899, at 3 (announcing the strike of the 
Newsboys to their readers); Newsies the Musical Study Guide, supra note 1, at 11 (explaining that the 
historical strike is the inspiration for the musical). 
 7 See NASAW, supra note 6, at 192 (quoting Don Seitz, managing editor of The World in a letter 
he wrote to Joseph Pulitzer analyzing the impact of the strike on the paper); The Strike of the News-
boys: Continues with Unabated Vigor and Spasmodic Attacks on So-Called “Scabs”—Women Not 
Molested, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1899 [hereinafter The Strike of the Newsboys] (quoting the Newsboys’ 
pleas). The boys pinned these pleas on their clothes and all over the city of New York on signs, lamp-
posts, etc. NASAW, supra note 6, at 187; The Strike of the Newsboys, supra. The newspapers tended to 
print any quotes from the boys in their dialects, and thus often made the boys sound unintelligent. 
Newsies vs. the World! The Newsboys Strike of 1899, BOWERY BOYS PODCAST (June 11, 2010), 
http://www.boweryboyshistory.com/2010/06/newsies-vs-world-Newsboys-strike-of.html [https://
perma.cc/CE8P-GNND] (summarizing the history of the Newsboy strike). 
 8 Compare NASAW, supra note 6, at 193 (explaining that the publishers did not meet with the 
Newsboys because doing so would give them legitimacy), with NEWSIES, supra note 1 (portraying 
Pulitzer meeting with a representative of the Newsboys). 
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fused to meet or bargain with the boys throughout the entirety of the strike.9 
The targeted papers called their “union” an “attempted boycott” of those who 
could not unionize because the Newsboys were not employees.10 
The importance of this distinction cannot be overstated.11 After the pas-
sage of the Wagner Act in 1935, better known as the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA), the question of whether workers constituted “employees” decid-
ed whether they could form a union and bargain with their employer.12 This 
distinction was tested when the Newsboys again made headlines in 1944, when 
the Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., decided that under 
the Wagner Act, full time Newsboys could be considered employees for pur-
poses of unionization and collective bargaining.13 Congress was unhappy with 
this decision and amended the statute to its current state, disqualifying inde-
pendent contractors from the rights of employees.14 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See NASAW, supra note 6, at 193 (finding that the publishers never met with the Newsboys 
during their strike); The Evening Journal and the Newsboys: A Plain Statement of Cause and Effect 
for the Benefit of the Public and the Boycotters, N.Y. J., July 28, 1899, at 3 [hereinafter The Evening 
Journal and the Newsboys] (representing The Evening Journal’s (“The Journal’s”) first public state-
ment about the Newsboys, in which it explained it buys back all unsold papers). 
 10 The Evening Journal and the Newsboys, supra note 9. The owners of these papers were notori-
ous publishers, Joseph Pulitzer and William Hearst. NASAW, supra note 6, at 183. David Nasaw, pro-
fessor of History at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York (and, ironically, a two-
time Pulitzer prize finalist), theorized that the union would have been heavily strengthened if Pulitzer 
and Hearst had decided to meet with any of its representatives. See id. at 193 (explaining that the 
decision not to meet with the union leaders was wise); Faculty Biography of David Nasaw, CUNY, 
https://www.gc.cuny.edu/Page-Elements/Academics-Research-Centers-Initiatives/Doctoral-Programs/
History/Faculty-Bios/David-Nasaw [https://perma.cc/CG6Y-GDQW] (providing Nasaws’ biography). 
 11 See National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018) (codifying that employees have the 
right to claim unfair labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)). Under the NLRA, 
even if the employees do not unionize, they have certain rights to organize, bargain, and to engage in 
other concerted activity. See id.; e.g., Trompler, Inc. v. NLRB., 338 F.3d 747, 748, 755 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that non-union employees had the right to walk out in protest of their coworker’s termination). 
Non-employee workers, however, hold no such rights. See National Labor Relations Act § 7. 
 12 See National Labor Relations Act § 7; Theodore J. St. Antoine, How the Wagner Act Came to 
Be: A Prospectus, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2201, 2204 (1998) (explaining Senator Robert F. Wagner’s aims 
and goals in the NLRA). The NLRA is often referred to as “The Wagner Act” because Senator Wag-
ner sponsored the bill. Antoine, supra. Because of the additions of amendments throughout the life of 
the NLRA, this Note will refer to “The Wagner Act” when talking about the NLRA before the addi-
tion of the Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947. Compare Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), with Na-
tional Labor Relations Act §§ 1–19. 
 13 See NLRB v. Hearst Publ’n, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 132 (1944) (holding that there is “ample basis” 
for the Board’s conclusion that a Newsboy is an employee). 
 14 See National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (reflecting the amendment in to-
day’s version of the NLRA); NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968) (describing congres-
sional reaction to Hearst Publications as adverse); H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 18 (1947) (showing Con-
gress’s dislike for the broadness of the Court’s definition of employee); ROBERT A. GORMAN ET AL., 
COX AND BOX’S LABOR LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 62 (16th ed. 2016) (explaining that Congress 
“flatly rejected” the Hearst Publications holding when they passed these amendments). 
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Today, with the restrictions in the NLRA, only about 43% of the U.S. la-
bor force has the right to join a union and collectively bargain with their em-
ployers.15 Because of the uncertainty of the definition of an “employee,” more 
and more companies attempt to shape their business models in such a way that 
their workers are explicitly not employees entitled to the rights prescribed by 
the NLRA.16 This uncertainty is partly due to the vagueness within the defini-
tion of employee, which, exceptions aside, defines an employee as “any em-
                                                                                                                           
 15 GORMAN, supra note 14, at 57. 
 16 See David Weil, Lots of Employees Get Misclassified as Contractors. Here’s Why It Matters, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (July 5, 2017) [hereinafter Weil, Why It Matters], https://hbr.org/2017/07/lots-of-
employees-get-misclassified-as-contractors-heres-why-it-matters [https://perma.cc/6J8B-5EV9] (ex-
plaining how confusion in the definition of “employee” in federal and state laws has assisted the trend 
of misclassification). One study suggests the use of “independent contractors” has increased about 
40% since 2005. Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The Rise and Nature of Alternative Work 
Arrangements in the United States, 1995–2015, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. 9 (2016), http://www.
nber.org/papers/w22667 [https://perma.cc/DZ9C-Q4Z7] (representing a growth of those who self-
identify as an independent contractor from 6.9% to 8.4% from 2005 to 2015). This is because of the 
flexibility and added benefits that employers, and even employees, can get when structuring their 
workforce this way. See, e.g., Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Is New Code Section 199A Really Going to 
Turn Us All into Independent Contractors? 1 (Jan. 12, 2018) (unpublished research paper), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3101180 [https://perma.cc/Z24Y-XVXY] (explaining that workers might adopt the 
label of independent contractors for various benefits like a 20% deduction in taxes while giving up 
various benefits like workplace protections); The Misclassification of Employees as Independent Con-
tractors, DEP’T OF PROF. EMPLOYEES AFL-CIO (2016), https://dpeaflcio.org/wp-content/uploads/
Misclassification-of-Employees-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2K3-ZLRG] (listing the various benefits 
and laws circumvented if an employer misclassifies their employees). For example, Disney, which 
through its musical “Newsies” shows the importance of unionization, utilizes a fair amount of its non-
employee labor through a program called “The Disney College Program” (“DCP”). See Sandra Pedi-
cini, Disney College Program Lures Thousands of Workers, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/business/tourism/os-disney-college-program-20150130-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/TZN2-B6T2] (explaining that up to twelve thousand students a year work in the 
DCP); cf. ROSS PERLIN, INTERN NATION: HOW TO EARN NOTHING AND LEARN LITTLE IN THE BRAVE 
NEW ECONOMY 2–3, 6 (2012) (putting the number closer to seven to eight thousand a year, but fifty 
thousand over the span of the program, and noting that depending on the time of day and location at 
Disney, interns can comprise over 50% of workers). The program hires “interns” as opposed to em-
ployees who typically work for a semester or more in full time unskilled roles like food and beverage, 
lifeguards, merchandise, etc. See Pedicini, supra, at 2; Disney College Program, DISNEY CAREERS, 
https://disneyprogramsblog.com/about/disney-college-program/disney-college-program-earning/ [https://
perma.cc/RR49-TJBK] (listing the available “roles”). Because of the short-term nature of the interns, 
they have none of the rights of a common law employee, meaning a significant chunk of Disney’s 
workforce has no rights under the NLRA, among other federal and state protections given to full time 
employees. PERLIN, supra, at 4 (explaining these interns take the jobs of their full time, unionized 
counterparts, weakening the economy); Michael A. Hacker, Comment, Permitted to Suffer for Experi-
ence: Second Circuit Uses “Primary Beneficiary” Test to Determine Whether Unpaid Interns Are 
Employees Under the FLSA in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 57 B.C.L. REV. E. SUPP. 67, 78 
(2016), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3499&context=bclr [https://perma.
cc/3R54-JNY3] (explaining that although some internships provide education value to interns, that 
should not deprive them of basic workplace rights). 
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ployee.”17 As a result, many “borderline” workers have to find the money to 
appeal to the court system to determine if they have rights.18 
This Note explores the modern-day definition of employee for purposes 
of unionization and collective bargaining through the case example of the 
Newsboys.19 Part I outlines the history of the Newsboys and their strike in the 
summer of 1889.20 Part II outlines the legal history of labor law and unioniza-
tion.21 Part III discusses how the law tries to distinguish today between an em-
ployee and an independent contractor when deciding who has the right to join 
a union.22 Part IV analyzes the impacts of the unclear employee definition on 
workers and argues that Congress should pass legislation making a clear and 
uniform definition of an employee.23 Further, it questions if independent con-
tractors should be excluded from having the right to engage in collective bar-
gaining with their employers.24 While much has changed since the Newsboys 
“seize[d] the day,” workers still must “stare down the odds” to determine if 
they are eligible to unionize.25 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See National Labor Relations Act § 2(3) (defining “employee” and excluding agricultural 
workers, those who work in domestic service, one working for their parent/spouse, a supervisor, an 
employee covered by the Railway Labor Act, or an independent contractor). 
 18 See, e.g., FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 504 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (FedEx I) (hold-
ing that FedEx delivery truck workers are independent contractors); David Streitfeld, Uber Drivers 
Win Preliminary Class-Action Status in Labor Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/07/12/business/uber-drivers-class-action.html (discussing the pending lawsuit 
where Uber drivers are trying to argue misclassification under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)); 
The Trustees of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90 1, 2 (Aug. 23, 2016) (overturning precedent 
and holding that graduate students are employees under the NLRA); Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Are 
They Students? Or Are They Employees? NLRB Rules That Graduate Students Are Employees, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/08/23/are-they-
students-or-are-they-employees-nlrb-rules-that-graduate-students-are-employees/?noredirect=on&
utm_term=.b8a6ad7b7044 [https://perma.cc/JE44-9GR3] (explaining that the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) overturned its previous decision and held graduate students could unionize as 
employees). But cf. Elizabeth A. Harris, Columbia University Says It Won’t Bargain with Graduate 
Student Union, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/30/nyregion/columbia-
university-wont-bargain-with-graduate-student-union.html [https://perma.cc/8L84-ZDJV] (noting that 
although the NLRB in 2016 ruled in favor of the graduate students, schools are still fighting that deci-
sion). 
 19 See infra notes 26–259 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 26–74 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 75–144 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 145–220 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 221–252 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 253–259 and accompanying text. 
 25 See National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2018) (defining “employee” for 
purposes of the NLRA); The Strike of the Newsboys, supra note 7 (announcing the Newsboy strike 
and explaining their goals); NEWSIES, supra note 1. 
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I. “THE WORLD WILL KNOW―AND THE JOURNAL TOO”: 
HISTORY OF THE NEWSBOY STRIKE OF 1899 
Although the Newsboy strike of 1899 occurred over a century ago, the ar-
guments that the Newsboys were not employees are similar to today’s argu-
ments that certain workers are independent contractors.26 While there are bene-
fits to a worker’s classification as an independent contractor, there are costs as 
well, including a lack of clarity on where they stand in terms of bargaining 
power.27 To better contextualize these costs, this Part will first look at the his-
torical strike of the Newsboys in 1899.28 Section A explains what a “Newsie” 
is and the events leading up to a strike.29 Section B illustrates the history of the 
actual strike and its results.30 
A. “Carrying the Banner”: The Life of a Newsie Prior to the Strike 
Before the days of cell phones, internet alerts, social media, and labor 
laws, the best way to get the daily news was to buy a newspaper on the streets 
from one of the countless young paper boys, predominantly aged eleven to 
fifteen.31 These Newsboys, or “Newsies,” would work from dawn until dusk 
selling newspapers for a penny to avoid taking a loss on any unsold newspa-
pers at the end of the day.32 The boys would buy the newspapers from the dis-
                                                                                                                           
 26 Compare Hearst Publ’n, Inc., 322 U.S. at 131–33 (explaining why the Board decided most 
Newsboys acted like employees using factors such as how many hours they worked, who furnished 
the equipment, for whose interests the sale was being done, how much reliance the boys had on their 
earnings, and who dictated prices), with FedEx I, 563 F.3d at 498 (using very similar criteria like who 
dictates working hours, who provides the equipment, and who controls the “manner and means” of 
performance to find FedEx workers are independent contractors under the NLRA). 
 27 See Oei & Ring, supra note 16, at 1 (explaining that there are a multitude of costs and benefits 
associated with being classified as an independent contractor); Weil, Why It Matters, supra note 16 
(showing how workers are unclear of what category they fit in). 
 28 See infra notes 31–74 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 31–45 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 46–74 and accompanying text. 
 31 See NASAW, supra note 6, at 75 (summarizing the history of the Newsboys). Adults sought 
more lucrative work, so the job was dominated by children. See Before “Newsies”: The Brooklyn 
Newsboys Strike of 1886, BOWERY BOYS HISTORY (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.boweryboyshistory.
com/2012/03/before-newsies-brooklyn-Newsboys-strike.html [https://perma.cc/MAT3-MYWU] (ex-
plaining that adults sought higher paying work because selling newspapers was difficult and had small 
profit margins). 
 32 James Gordon, Carrying the Banner: How the Real Life Nineteenth Century Newsies Worked 
the Streets of America’s East Coast Cities Selling Newspapers to Support Themselves, DAILY MAIL 
(Oct. 19, 2013), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2467498/Carrying-banner-How-real-life-
nineteenth-century-newsies-worked-streets-cities-Americas-East-Coast-selling-newspapers-support-
themselves.html [https://perma.cc/3UFE-8BLJ] (explaining that Newsboy is another word for Newsie 
and explaining their work schedules). It is unclear when the term “Newsies” emerged. See NASAW, 
supra note 6, at 66 (using the terms “Newsie” and “Newsboy” interchangeably); see also NEWSIES, 
supra note 1 (using the term “Newsies” to describe the Newsboys). Newsboys and Newsies are terms 
often used interchangeably, though in 1899, the time this Note is focused on, Newsboy was the more 
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tributors and estimate how many they could sell given a number of factors like 
the weather or allure of the day’s headline.33 If they miscalculated, they would 
suffer a loss and may not have enough to buy papers the next day.34 Even so, 
the Newsboys generally liked the work as it was a mix between playing out-
side and making money.35 While these boys were reliant on selling the news-
papers, the newspaper publishers were also reliant on the boys.36 The boys 
were often loyal to selling one newspaper, and as such the newspapers would 
fight for the boys’ loyalties to keep their numbers up.37 
In the late 1800s, with the labor movement at a peak and strikes at a high, 
the first sign of discontentment was the Newsboy strike of 1886.38 A compara-
tively quiet and forgotten strike, it started because The Brooklyn Times was 
selling newspapers at varying prices to Newsboys in different regions of 
Brooklyn to try and “push” sales in certain districts.39 The strike lasted a few 
days, with some reports of violence, until the newsstand sellers, mainly adults, 
joined in and The Brooklyn Times agreed to sell their newspaper at the same, 
lower cost for Newsboys in all areas of Brooklyn.40 
The Newsboys remained relatively quiet until 1889, when the next strike 
arose over a rumor that the price of the Evening Sun and the Evening World 
would be raised from fifty to sixty cents for a hundred copies.41 The boys 
slowly discovered the report was untrue, though there was a short-lived day or 
so of violence and announcements of strikes.42 In 1898, however, during the 
                                                                                                                           
commonly used term, and as such, it is the preferred term in this Note. See NASAW, supra note 6, at 
66 (quoting works from the time that called the boys “Newsboys”); The Strike of the Newsboys, supra 
note 7 (using Newsboys as the preferred term in the 1899 newspaper article announcing the strike). 
 33 NASAW, supra note 6, at 80–82. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 76 (citing a University of Chicago study in 1918 of 378 Newsboys, 87% of which re-
sponded that they liked the work). Newsboys were an ethnically diverse group, although economically 
they were often similarly situated. See id. at 72–74. A few of the famous men who got their starts as 
Newsboys include the Warner Brothers, Louis Armstrong, and the Marx Brothers. Id. at 74. 
 36 Id. at 68–69. 
 37 Id. at 69. While some newspapers tried bribing the boys with turkeys on the holidays and tick-
ets to plays, sports games, and the like, a lesser used tactic was intimidation. Id. William Hearst, one 
of the leading newspaper tycoons, whose Evening Journal the boys would later strike against, was 
known for hiring “thugs” for his Chicago newspapers to scare the boys into staying loyal. Id. at 70. 
 38 See Before “Newsies”: The Brooklyn Newsboys Strike of 1886, supra note 31 (outlining the 
history of the 1886 strike). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See Newsboys on Strike: Many Fights and Two Arrests by the Police, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 
1889, at 8 (explaining that the Newsboys went on strike because of the rumored price change). 
 42 Id. Many of the boys who went to the offices of the newspapers and discovered that the change 
in price was untrue tried to sell their newspapers as normal, but the boys who believed the rumor 
called them “scabs,” a slang term referring to one who continues working when on strike. See News-
boys on Strike: Many Fights and Two Arrests by the Police, supra note 41 (explaining the events of 
the strike); The Strike of the Newsboys, supra note 7 (providing an example of the use of “scab”). 
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Spanish-American War, when circulation was high and people were buying 
newspapers at record numbers, the rumor that caused the previous Newsboy 
strike became a reality.43 William Hearst of The Journal and Joseph Pulitzer of 
The World raised their prices for the Newsboys from fifty cents to sixty cents 
for every one hundred newspapers.44 Although the Newsboys did not protest at 
the time of the price surge as circulation was high due to the war, in the sum-
mer of 1899, when the war died down, the Newsboys began to feel the ramifi-
cations of the price increase.45 
B. “‘Stead of Hawking Headlines, We’ll Be Making ‘em  
Today”: The Newsies Strike 
On July 19, 1899, the Newsboys formed “The Newsboy Union,” elected 
leaders, and announced their intention to strike over the increase in prices for 
the Newsboys.46 They tried to go to the newspaper companies to arbitrate, but 
                                                                                                                           
Examples of violence in the strike included burned newspapers, attacking “scabs,” and assaults of 
police officers. Newsboys on Strike: Many Fights and Two Arrests by the Police, supra note 41. 
 43 See NASAW, supra note 6, at 183–84 (noting that the Newsboys did not feel the effects of the 
change as much when the papers were selling during the war); Newsboys Go on Strike: They Want the 
Old Price of Two Evening Newspapers Restored, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1899, at 10 (explaining that 
The World and The Journal refused to lower their prices from sixty to fifty cents). 
 44 Newsboys Go on Strike: They Want the Old Price of Two Evening Newspapers Restored, supra 
note 43; NASAW, supra note 6, at 183–84. Hearst and Pulitzer were fierce competitors, both known 
for creating “yellow journalism,” which is where news is exaggerated and painted as more fanatical to 
try and entice more sales of newspapers. See NASAW, supra note 6, at 183–84; Joseph Pulitzer Dies 
Suddenly, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1911, https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/learning/
general/onthisday/bday/0410.html?scp=1&sq=joseph%2520pulitzer&st=cse [https://perma.cc/QBG9-
WNA5] (explaining that Pulitzer’s use of “yellow journalism” was only matched by Hearst). Because 
of this, the Newsboys often called their newspapers “the yellows,” and much of the boys’ promotional 
material for the strike put the newspapers’ names in yellow ink. Newsboys’ Strike Swells: Hits the 
Robber Barons a Most Painful Whack, THE EVENING SUN, July 23, 1899, at 2 (publishing pictures of 
the circulars created by the Newboys). 
 45 NASAW, supra note 6, at 184. The price was presumably not affected by inflation as in the time 
from 1890–1900, there was a period of deflation. Consumer Price Index (Estimate) 1800–, FED. RE-
SERVE BANK OF MINN., https://www.minneapolisfed.org/community/financial-and-economic-education/
cpi-calculator-information/consumer-price-index-1800 [https://perma.cc/VRF6-NBS6] (citing to UNITED 
STATES BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP’T OF LAB., HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS (1974)) 
(showing that in the ten years there was only deflation). 
 46 Newsboys ‘Go Out’: Oppressed by the Prices Fixed by the Red-Headed Extra Trust, THE SUN, 
July 20, 1899, at 3 (referring to the striking party as the “Newsboys’ Union”). While rarer, many 
“Newsgirls” went on strike as well, the leader and most prominent of which was a girl named Annie, 
often referred to as “Annie of the Sun office,” who heavily supported the boys strike. See Newsboys 
Act and Talk: Fight and Champion Their Cause in Mass Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1899, at 3 
(quoting Annie’s speech at the Newsboy mass meeting in favor of the strike); Newsboys ‘Go Out’: 
Oppressed by the Prices Fixed by the Red-Headed Extra Trust, supra (announcing that Annie wants 
the newsgirls to strike); Newsboys’ Strike Swells: Hits the Robber Barons a Most Painful Whack, 
supra note 44 (quoting Kid Blink that Annie was with the Newsboys). The Newsboys acted when they 
did because, with the adult Motorcar strikes in New York that were taking place, the police were busy, 
making it the ideal time to strike. NASAW, supra note 6, at 186. 
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the newspapers did not respond to their request, as they were merely chil-
dren.47 The boys, for their part, were clear: if anyone was found selling the 
forbidden newspapers, The Journal and The World, they would be stopped by 
force.48 “Scabs,” a colloquial term for those who continue to work during a 
strike, were attacked, newspapers were shredded, and the first arrests were 
made.49 While there were originally three hundred striking boys, there are 
claims that the number climbed to three thousand as more and more regions of 
the city joined in their strike.50 The boys began circulating banners, pins, and 
pamphlets, each pleading to consumers to stop buying The Journal and The 
World and to support the Newsboys in their strike efforts.51 Desperate to halt 
circulation, the boys attacked news wagons and drivers that delivered the 
newspapers.52 Soon, the newspapers felt the pain of the strike.53 Advertisers, 
angry at the decrease in circulation or possibly sensitive to the boys’ pleas, be-
gan to pull their advertisements or demand a decrease in price.54 
                                                                                                                           
 47 See NASAW, supra note 6, at 188 (explaining that the boys’ opponents did not see the children 
as an actual threat due to their age and maturity); Newsboys Go on Strike: Want More Profit in the 
Sale of Two Evening Papers, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., July 21, 1899, at 10 (quoting one of the Newsboys 
leaders explanation of his attempt to arbitrate with the Newspapers). 
 48 See Newsboys Go on Strike: Want More Profit in the Sale of Two Evening Papers, supra note 
47, at 10 (quoting one of the striking Newsboys). No other newspapers raised their rates, and as such 
they seized the opportunity handed to them by standing with the boys and publishing their stories 
daily. NASAW, supra note 6, at 186. The World and Journal refused to publish on the Newsboy 
strikes, but regularly published on the Motorcar Strikes, demanding arbitration for the strikers. See 
Plan to Down Newsboys: Hiring Men at $2 a Day and 40 Cents a Hundred Papers, N.Y. SUN, July 
24, 1899, at 2 (illustrating how the boys would cut out the headlines from The World reporting on the 
Motorcar Strike and paste them onto their own materials and signs to point out the hypocrisy). The 
World, in a statement, blamed newspapers like the N.Y. Sun for fueling the strike for personal gain. Id. 
(quoting a spokesperson for The World). 
 49 Newsboys Go on Strike: They Want the Old Price of Two Evening Newspapers Restored, supra 
note 43. While the boys were comfortable attacking “scabs,” they had trouble fighting women “scabs” 
who took the opportunity given by the strike to increase their own circulation. The Strike of the News-
boys, supra note 7. 
 50 See Newsboys Go on Strike: Want More Profit on the Sale of Two Evening Papers, supra note 
47 (explaining the boys’ original numbers); The Strike of the Newsboys, supra note 7 (quoting one of 
the boys’ estimates of their numbers). 
 51 See Newsboys’ Word Stands: They Still Refuse to Sell Papers They Have Boycotted, N.Y. 
TRIB., July 23, 1899, at 3 (reporting that the Newsboys carried their placards around on sticks with the 
aim of convincing the public to support them); The Strike of the Newsboys, supra note 7. 
 52 NASAW, supra note 6, at 187; Plan to Down Newsboys: Hiring Men at $2 a day and 40 Cents a 
Hundred Papers, supra note 48 (illustrating how the boys would stone the drivers, tear up the news-
papers inside the wagons or set fire to the papers). 
 53 See NASAW, supra note 6, at 182 (unveiling an internal memorandum of The World that de-
scribed the economic effect of the strike, referring to the effort as an “extraordinary demonstration”). 
 54 See id. (quoting Don Seitz, managing editor of The World, in his memorandum to Pulitzer 
dated July 24, 1899); Newsboys’ Strike Swells: Hits the Robber Barons a Most Painful Whack, supra 
note 44 (quoting “Kid Blink,” one of the leaders of the strike). 
2560 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2551 
The World and The Journal realized they needed to get their circulation 
back to normal.55 As such, they offered adults a daily salary of two dollars, 
with the price at forty cents per one hundred newspapers.56 This attempt failed, 
however, because the hired men, sympathetic to the Newsboys, signed up to 
work and then did not show up.57 
The boys began demanding arbitration.58 They believed they should have 
the price lowered to forty cents per hundred newspapers to account for their 
losses and pointed out the hypocrisy of the newspapers, both of which had 
been demanding arbitration for other workers in a Motorcar strike that was 
happening simultaneously in New York.59 
The boys’ efforts culminated in a mass meeting of all the striking regions 
of Newsboys at New Irving.60 There were an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 boys 
who attended the meeting, and most of the union leaders spoke, as did promi-
nent political leaders in the area.61 In response to the newspapers claiming that 
the ten cent increase was necessary to continue turning a profit, “Kid Blink,” a 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See NASAW, supra note 6, at 192 (referring to the economic loss as “colossal”). 
 56 Plan to Down Newsboys: Hiring Men at $2 a Day and 40 Cents a Hundred Papers, supra note 
48. The World and The Journal likely hoped adults would not be too scared of the children to sell their 
papers. Id. 
 57 Id.; see Newsboys’ Strike Swells: Hits the Robber Barons a Most Painful Whack, supra note 44 
(quoting one of the men who signed up to sell the papers, who noted that “it’s all a bluff”). 
 58 See Newsboys’ Word Stands: They Still Refuse to Sell the Papers They Have Boycotted, supra 
note 51 (quoting a letter sent to the Tribune in which the boys called for arbitration). 
 59 Id. The Trolley Strike was against the Brooklyn Rapid Transit Co., whose workers wanted 
higher wages, better working conditions, and recognition of their union. Strike of Trolley Men: Ties 
Up Street Car Traffic at Brooklyn, L.A. HERALD (July 17, 1899), https://cdnc.ucr.edu/cgi-bin/cdnc?a
=d&d=LAH18990717.2.2 [https://perma.cc/DSY3-TY3K] (reporting on the Brooklyn strike). The 
Journal and The World both regularly chastised the Brooklyn Rapid Transit Co. for refusing to arbi-
trate with the motorcar strikers, which fueled the Newsboys’ anger regarding their own similar situa-
tion. Great Meet of Newsboys, N.Y. SUN, July 25, 1899, at 2 (quoting Dave Simons, president of the 
Newsboy Union); Newsboys’ Word Stands: They Still Refuse to Sell the Papers They Have Boycotted, 
supra note 51 (printing the language from the Newsboys’ demand for arbitration where the Newsboys 
cited the fact the papers had been calling for arbitration in the Trolley Strike). 
 60 See Newsboys Act and Talk: Fight and Champion Their Cause in a Mass Meeting, supra note 1 
(reporting on Newsboys’ meeting). Irving Hall is a large public meeting hall well known and used in 
New York City. See Irving Hall Overhauled, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 1862), https://www.nytimes.com/
1862/09/25/archives/irving-hall-overhauled.html [https://perma.cc/32W3-ZW3L] (announcing the 
renovation of Irving Hall, the “most attractive concert room in the City,” thus becoming New Irving 
Hall). 
 61 See Great Meet of Newsboys, supra note 59 (reporting the events of the meeting); Newsboys 
Act and Talk: Fight and Champion Their Cause in a Mass Meeting, supra note 1 (including Assem-
blymen and their representatives, representatives from the Newsdealers’ Association, and one “man of 
the baseball field”). Most of the union leaders were also children, like eleven-year-old Boots 
McAleenan, but some were older, like twenty-one-year-old David Simons. See NASAW, supra note 6, 
at 186 (noting that in general, the strikers were children, including Boots McAleenan); New-York 
Newsboys, N.Y. TRIB. ILLUSTRATED SUPPLEMENT, July 30, 1899 (providing David Simons’ age). It is 
likely that most of the union organizers were in fact children under the age of eighteen. NASAW, supra 
note 6, at 186. 
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Newsboy who is considered one of the driving forces of the Newsboy Union, 
screamed out “I’m tryin’ to figure out how 10 cents on a hundred papers can 
mean more to a millionaire than it does to a Newsboy, an’ I can’t see it.”62 
While the leaders at the meeting called for the Newsboys to end the violence 
against scabs and to keep the protest clean, the violence continued throughout 
the strike.63 
Though the strike began to unravel, the Newsboys gained enough public at-
tention to provoke a public statement from The Journal.64 The Journal made its 
position clear—the Newsboys were not employees, and therefore could not 
strike.65 It stated its support of unions, but expressed that the Newsboys could 
not be a union.66 This was, instead, a boycott on behalf of their merchants, or 
independent contractors.67 In the statement, it insisted that they had bought back 
unsold newspapers from the Newsboys at the end of work days, which was not 
true prior to the strike but was the compromise established at the end.68 
                                                                                                                           
 62 Great Meet of Newsboys, supra note 59 (quoting Kid Blink). The papers, in reporting the strike, 
always quoted the boys in their accents and slang, and some theorize that this undermined the boys’ 
attempts by making them sound uneducated. BOWERY BOYS PODCAST, supra note 7. Once they 
gained prominence, the boys were also typically given nicknames, like “Kid Blink” (who was nick-
named such for being blind in one eye). See Joe Sharkey, Word for Work/Newsboy Nostalgia; Flash! 
Street Urchins Hawk Tabs on City Streets!, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/
2000/09/17/weekinreview/word-for-word-newsboy-nostalgia-flash-street-urchins-hawk-tabs-on-city-
streets.html [https://perma.cc/A32H-4LSU] (noting why Kid Blink was given his nickname and that 
the newspapers in 1899 reported on him more often than most Newsboys). Kid Blink’s official title 
was a “walking delegate.” New-York Newsboys, supra note 61. The World, in their statement made at 
the end of the strike, explained its loss would be because the current public expected a larger newspa-
per than they had in the past, so the previous prices were too low considering this new, larger newspa-
per. Plain Statement of Facts for Public Consideration, N.Y. WORLD, Aug. 3, 1899, at 12 (expressing 
The World’s opinions on the strike against its company). 
 63 Great Meet of Newsboys, supra note 59 (illustrating multiple situations of violence against 
scabs, including a twelve-year-old clubbing scabs). 
 64 See The Evening Journal and the Newsboys, supra note 9 (reflecting the statement of the Jour-
nal). Specifically, the boys gained so much attention that a delegation stepped in on behalf of the 
National Newsdealers’ and Stationers’ Association, which is meant to represent anyone who works 
selling newspapers in any capacity. Id. It is relevant that the article uses the word “boycotters” as 
opposed to “strike” because it implies and asserts that the boys are not employees with rights to strike. 
See id. (using the language “boycotters”). 
 65 See id. (asserting that this union was an “unorganized movement,” and that no strike existed). 
 66 See id. (proclaiming that every employee of the paper is a union employee). 
 67 Id. The statement also cited an annual net loss of one hundred thousand dollars if they gave into 
the boys’ demands. Id. 
 68 See NASAW, supra note 6, at 192 (explaining the compromise); The Evening Journal and the 
Newsboys, supra note 9 (reporting on The Journal’s statement that they always bought back unsold 
papers). The statements from both papers also asserted that every newspaper in New York charged the 
Newsboys sixty cents for the newspapers, which appears unfounded considering all the other evidence 
from the strike. Plain Statement of Facts for Public Consideration, supra note 62; The Evening Jour-
nal and the Newsboys, supra note 9; see Great Meet of Newsboys, supra note 59 (quoting one of the 
strike leaders that the other papers treat the boys fairly); Newsboys Go on Strike: They Want the Old 
Price of Two Evening Newspapers Restored, supra note 43 (asserting these are the two papers that 
changed prices). 
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After the statement, the alleged strike continued to crumble, with the cir-
culation of the forbidden newspapers and increasing arrests of the strike’s 
leaders.69 By July 30th, The World broke its silence as well, announcing the 
Newsboys “boycott” had come to an end.70 Although that was not quite the 
case yet, the alleged strike was nearing an end.71 The union made last-ditch 
efforts to elect new leadership even as newspapers announced that their strike 
was a failure.72 It was not all for naught, however, as the strike resulted in a 
compromise—the boys began reselling the newspapers when the newspaper 
publishers began to buy all unsold newspapers back at full price at the end of 
the day.73 Nevertheless, The World continued to assert that no strike existed, 
just an unorganized boycott of those ineligible to form a union.74 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See “Kid” Blink Arrested: The Newsboys’ Strike Reaches a Stage of Uncertainty—Aid from 
Newsdealers, N.Y. TRIB., July 28, 1899, at 2 (noting that there were more of the papers on the street 
than at any point previously during the strike and that Kid Blink was arrested for disorderly conduct). 
Among those arrested, the highest profile was Kid Blink, who was arrested for disorderly conduct. Id. 
There were reports that an offer was made to the strike leaders to sell the newspapers for fifty cents 
per hundred newspapers, and it was refused. Id. Considering the allegations of bribes against Kid 
Blink, the rank-and-file Newsboys were not as sympathetic to his arrest, even though he testified after 
being released on bail he would lead the fight “with renewed bitterness.” Id. The World and The Jour-
nal both rejected the term strike and noted in their papers that this was a boycott, even though all the 
other papers headlines referred to it as a “strike.” Compare The Evening Journal and the Newsboys, 
supra note 9 (avoiding and denouncing the word “strike), and Plain Statement of Facts for Public 
Consideration, supra note 62 (same), with Newsboys’ Strike Swells: Hits the Robber Barons a Most 
Painful Whack, supra note 44 (using the word “strike” in their headlines), and Newsboys Go on 
Strike: Want More Profit in the Sale of Two Evening Papers, supra note 47 (same). In The World’s 
internal memos, however, the word “strike” was used to describe the movement. See NASAW, supra 
note 6, at 182 (quoting the memorandum titled “On the Newsboys Strike”). 
 70 Herald Employees Sued for $10,000, N.Y. WORLD, July 30, 1899, at 2 (explaining a suit for 
false arrest that arose out of the strike). The article also illustrated a story where a Newsboy pulled a 
pistol on a man for asserting to other Newsboys that they were being tricked into continuing the boy-
cott. Id. 
 71 See NASAW, supra note 6, at 192 (explaining the strike ended on August 2nd); Declare News-
boys’ Strike a Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1899 (explaining that a delegation of Newsdealers, for-
merly aligned with the Newsboys, began passing out notices that the strike was a failure). 
 72 See Declare Newsboys’ Strike a Failure, supra note 71 (explaining that the strike was at its 
end); Striking Newsboys Elect Officers, N.Y. SUN, July 31, 1899, at 2 (explaining that the Newsboys 
elected a new president and vice president in response to their former leaders’ “treason”); The News-
boys Form a New Union: Elect a Man as Leader and Will Divide City into Districts, N.Y. TIMES, July 
31, 1899, at 2 (reporting that the Newsboys chose an adult to be their new president). It also did not 
help that, at the same time, three strikers were being charged with extortion for allegedly blackmailing 
the newspapers and asking for money in exchange for an end to the strike, with the promise that oth-
erwise the strike would worsen. See Newsboys Up for Blackmail: Held for Trial on Charges Growing 
out of a Meeting with World and Journal Representatives, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1899 (illustrating a 
story where Newsboys offered to end the strike for $600). 
 73 See NASAW, supra note 6, at 192 (explaining the compromise between the Newsboys and the 
publishers of the papers); Newsboys Boycott Over, N.Y. TRIB., Aug. 2, 1899, at 3 (reporting that most 
boys were now handing out the papers they previously boycotted, although there was still some vio-
lence). There were still a few riots even after the announcement, but overall, the strike had ended. 
Newsboys Boycott Over, supra. 
 74 See Plain Statement of Facts for Public Consideration, supra note 62. 
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II. “WE’RE A UNION JUST BY SAYING SO”: BACKGROUND ON THE 
CREATION OF SUBSEQUENT LABOR LAWS AND THEIR  
EFFECT ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF NEWSBOYS 
Following the Newsboy strike, questions of labor and employment rights 
gained steam in America, and the concept of unionization resonated with a 
large portion of America.75 After the turn of the century, Congress took notice 
and began to pass legislation solidifying workers’ rights.76 Workers like the 
Newsboys began seeing hope for their movement as union efforts and shifts in 
public opinion in favor of workers’ rights helped influence court decisions.77 
This Part gives a legal background to the labor issues discussed herein.78 
Section A outlines the history of unionization in the United States.79 Section B 
then discusses the progression of case law defining who may strike.80 Finally, 
Section C recognizes the current trend towards the use of independent contrac-
tors as opposed to employees in the workplace.81 
A. “Wrongs Will Be Righted If We’re United”: A Brief History of 
Unionization in the United States 
Unions first formed in the United States in the late 1700s.82 They initially 
struggled because they were often classified as illegal “criminal conspiracies” 
against the employer.83 Courts relied on the theory that actions taken in an at-
tempt to gain labor benefits negatively affected public interest through trade 
and commerce and therefore were criminal.84 In 1842, however, the Massachu-
                                                                                                                           
 75 See CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS 68–69 (1985) (noting that union 
membership from 1897 to 1903 went from five hundred thousand to two million). 
 76 See The U.S. Department of Labor Historical Timeline, DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/
100/timeline/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery#2 [https://perma.cc/HW9Z-WSXF] 
[hereinafter Timeline] (walking through the timeline of different labor laws Congress passed begin-
ning in 1916); see, e.g., Federal Employees Compensation Act, 39 Stat. 742 (1916) (as amended in 5 
U.S.C. § 8101 et seq. (2012)) (giving compensation to injured public employees on the job compensa-
tion); Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (as amended in 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2012)) (stating 
the purpose of the legislation is to alleviate tensions between railway workers and their employers). 
 77 See GARY CHAISON, UNIONS IN AMERICA 10 (2006) (online PDF) (discussing the legal dis-
course regarding workers’ rights progressing, from adverse, to neutral, and eventually to positive); 
e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ’n, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 132 (1944) (ruling that full time Newsboys are em-
ployees); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937) (explaining that the right to 
self-organization is a fundamental right). 
 78 See infra notes 82–144 and accompanying text. 
 79 See infra notes 82–104 and accompanying text. 
 80 See infra notes 105–132 and accompanying text. 
 81 See infra notes 133–144 and accompanying text. 
 82 CHAISON, supra note 77, at 2. 
 83 Id. 
 84 See Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Metc.) 111, 122 (1842) (explaining the theory of 
criminal conspiracy before declaring it incorrect); Lambert v. The People, 9 Cow. 578, 596 (N.Y. 
1827) (questioning if something should be a conspiracy if the act is not a crime in itself). This theory 
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setts Supreme Judicial Court, in Commonwealth v. Hunt, ruled that because 
unions were not conspiring to do anything illegal, unions were therefore not 
engaged in punishable illegal activity.85 After this ruling, criminal conspiracy 
charges against unions rarely, if ever, succeeded in court.86 
With this win, major labor unions began to form.87 In 1866, the National 
Labor Union (“NLU”), one of the first of these major unions, was created with 
the purpose of pushing for better hours, wages, and coordination among fellow 
employees for workers’ rights.88 The NLU ultimately dissolved in 1873, but its 
work raised public awareness of the need for labor reform, increasing union 
support.89 Taking its place, the Knights of Labor (“The Knights”), founded in 
1869, rapidly gained support and became the largest national union due to their 
success in many strikes and their advocacy work, including their fight for the 
eight-hour workday.90 They, however, also failed due to public fear of union 
violence and strikes.91 Replacing them in 1886 was the American Federation of 
Labor (“AFL”) which, unlike its predecessors, focused on providing support to 
local, specialized labor unions.92 
                                                                                                                           
came from English common law. See Hunt, 45 Mass. at 122 (relying on English precedent); Lambert, 
9 Cow. at 623 (announcing that English common law must be followed); GORMAN, supra note 14, at 6 
(noting that this theory was borrowed from English common law); Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Con-
spiracies in American Law 1880–1930, 66 TEX. L. REV. 919, 922 (1988) (explaining that American 
courts used the theory from the British “Combination Acts,” which disallowed conspiracy of employ-
ees to strike). 
 85 Hunt, 45 Mass. at 123. The court found that the purpose of the association was to encourage 
other Bootstrappers to join the association, which is not an illegal purpose, and as such ruled that it 
could not be an illegal conspiracy. Id. at 129. 
 86 See GORMAN, supra note 14, at 6 (explaining how these cases mostly stopped being prosecuted 
after Hunt). 
 87 CHAISON, supra note 77, at 2. 
 88 Id. at 3. They tried to create political impact, so they lobbied Congress for the eight-hour work-
day. Today in History—August 20: 8-Hour Work Day, LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/item/
today-in-history/august-20 [https://perma.cc/VB4V-9X3R] [hereinafter Today in History] (explaining 
the history of the eight-hour workday). The National Labor Union failed in convincing Congress be-
fore they ultimately dissolved. Id. 
 89 Today in History, supra note 88. 
 90 CHAISON, supra note 77, at 3; Today in History, supra note 88. The Knights of Labor (“The 
Knights”) were originally a secret society due to fear of termination of its members if their employers 
found out they had joined. CHAISON, supra note 77, at 3. 
 91 See CHAISON, supra note 77, at 4 (explaining the public’s hostility). This fear was exacerbated 
by a strike in Chicago’s Haymarket, in which another strike that The Knights were not involved in 
resulted in a bombing that left seven officers dead, thereby causing retaliation from the other officers 
causing one death and many injured strikers. Id. Chaison also cites The Knight’s lofty goals and un-
clear message to be another cause of its downfall. Id. 
 92 Id. at 5; Today in History, supra note 88. The Newsboys, serious about unionization even after 
the turn of the century, tried to work with the American Federation of Labor (“AFL”) to make a 
Newsboys’ union through the AFL, even sending a representative from Boston in 1901 to call for a 
nationwide Newsboy union. See NASAW, supra note 6, at 198 (explaining the history of the Newsboy 
Union and strikes and noting that the Boston Union was the one Newsboy union to remain post-
strike). In 1955, the AFL merged with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (“CIO”) to become 
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Those against labor unions at this time viewed unionization as a form of 
socialism and therefore a threat to capitalism and democracy.93 This fear found 
its way into judicial scholarship when the Sherman Antitrust Act (“Sherman 
Act”) of 1890 gave opponents of unions the tools to bring civil, as opposed to 
criminal, conspiracy claims against unions.94 Congress attempted to limit this 
in 1914 through the Clayton Antitrust Act (“Clayton Act”) by prohibiting in-
junctions against unions.95 The Supreme Court limited this right to only direct 
employee/employer relationships in 1921, in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. 
Deering, thus allowing injunctions for secondary boycotts and severely weak-
ening the intention of the Clayton Act.96 
                                                                                                                           
the AFL-CIO, which is to date one of the largest union organizing groups, representing over 12.5 
million employees in fifty-five labor unions. Our Labor History Timeline, AFL-CIO, https://
aflcio.org/about/history [https://perma.cc/7VNP-WM65] (outlining the history of the organization); 
About Us, AFL-CIO, https://aflcio.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/3QL7-X5R2] (providing their repre-
sentation numbers). 
 93 See Hovenkamp, supra note 84, at 920 (explaining why judicial hostility seemingly existed 
towards unions); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Justice, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, The Path 
of Law, Address at the Dedication of the New Hall of the Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 
1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 467 (1897) (explaining that socialism scared the community). 
 94 See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (making unlawful “every contract . . . in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States”); Hovenkamp, supra note 84, at 919 (explain-
ing the Act’s use as a “union-busting” tool). The Sherman Antitrust Act (“Sherman Act”) was silent 
on labor unions, and thus many contended that its intention was unrelated to labor, but simply to keep 
consumer prices down by stopping conspiracies by powerful businesses to inflate prices. See Allen 
Bradley Co. v. Union, 325 U.S. 797, 801–02 (1945) (explaining the differing viewpoints as to the 
Sherman Act’s drafters’ intentions towards unions). Others contended that although silent on labor 
unions, the Act meant to stop interruptions in trade and any efforts that could cause monopolies, in-
cluding organized labor. Id. at 802. The Supreme Court affirmed the latter opinion and upheld the use 
of the Sherman Act against labor. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 292 (1908) (holding that un-
ionization efforts properly reflected a “restraint of trade” within the meaning of the Sherman Act). 
 95 See Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 15 and 29 U.S.C. (2012)); Allen Bradley Co., 325 U.S. at 803 (stating that the Clay-
ton Antitrust Act (“Clayton Act”) was intended to amend the Sherman Act’s application against un-
ions); Alesna v. Rica, 74 F. Supp. 865, 870 (1947) (establishing that the Clayton Act was passed in 
response to labor unions prosecution under the Sherman Antitrust Act); Hovenkamp, supra note 84, at 
963 (explaining that the Clayton Act was passed in response to federal antitrust laws). The Clayton 
Act’s language unambiguously allows unions. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (“[T]he labor of a human being is 
not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to 
forbid the existence and operation of labor . . . organizations . . . nor shall such organizations, or the 
members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, 
under the antitrust laws.”). The Clayton Act further states that “no restraining order or injunction shall 
be granted . . . in any case between an employer and employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 52. The Clayton Act not 
only adds these protections for labor unions, but also gives a private person the right to injunctive 
relief against a party. 15 U.S.C. § 26. 
 96 See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 478 (1921) (holding that the injunc-
tion against the union for the secondary boycott should be upheld); see also Allen Bradley Co., 325 
U.S. at 805 (clarifying that the Court in Deering held that controversies not in the immediate em-
ployment relationship were not “labor disputes” under the Clayton Act). A “secondary boycott” is 
when a union coerces others not to buy, sell, or otherwise work for an employer. Deering, 254 U.S. at 
466. The Court in Deering analyzed the Clayton Act narrowly, holding that section twenty banning 
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During World War I, when unemployment rates were up, the labor 
movement resurged.97 But, in the 1920s, employers fought unionization with 
newfound vigor and increasingly forced employees to sign non-unionization 
contracts, or “yellow-dog” contracts.98 Congress, in response, passed the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act in 1932.99 This not only banned yellow-dog contracts but it 
also made clear that injunctions are not available in labor disputes, thus mostly 
ending these conspiracy claims.100 
                                                                                                                           
injunctions in employment situations only applies when dealing with a direct employment relation-
ship. 29 U.S.C. § 52; Deering, 254 U.S. at 466, 476, 478. Therefore, the Deering Court held that 
plaintiffs may use the Clayton Act to issue injunctions against unions and defendants engaged in sec-
ondary boycotts. Deering, 254 U.S. at 478; see 15 U.S.C. § 26. After this case, injunctions in second-
ary boycotts became popular, which made the Clayton Act’s union protective policy essentially “back-
fire.” See 15 U.S.C. § 26; GORMAN, supra note 14, at 27 (explaining that the Clayton Act was a legis-
lative failure in light of the Deering holding, which made injunctions easily attainable); Hovenkamp, 
supra note 84, at 964 (lamenting “[n]ever did a statute backfire so badly”). 
 97 CHAISON, supra note 77, at 8. 
 98 See id. at 9 (explaining that 1.6 million workers left unions during this period); DAVID P. 
TWOMEY, LABOR LAW & LEGISLATION 76 (6th ed. 1980) (validating the nickname of “yellow-dog” 
contracts). A yellow-dog contract is formed when an employee agrees not to join a union, collectively 
bargain, and/or strike as a condition of employment. JOEL I. SEIDMAN, THE YELLOW DOG CONTRACT 
11 (1932). Employers also tried other tactics such as collaborating to force all manufacturers to refuse 
to hire union workers, creating a blacklist of known union sympathizers that would render them not 
hirable, and reacting with violence to strikes, increasing anti-strike sentiment. CHAISON, supra note 
77, at 9. These non-unionization contracts were declared legal by the Supreme Court and did not lose 
favor until Congress began attempting to legislate against them. TWOMEY, supra. Unions are reported 
to have feared that both injunction and the yellow-dog contract would lead to their end unless they 
found a decent solution. See SEIDMAN, supra, at 33–34. (quoting the President of the Pennsylvania 
Federation of Labor). 
 99 See Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115 (2012); Allen Bradley 
Co., 325 U.S. at 805 (explaining the Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed in response to the Supreme 
Court’s narrow analysis of the Clayton Act); Matthew W. Finkin, The Meaning and Contemporary 
Vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 93 NEB. L. REV. 6, 27 (2014) (explaining the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act was created partially in response to yellow-dog contracts). The Act was also known as the Federal 
Anti-Injunction Act. TWOMEY, supra note 98, at 31. 
 100 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–103. The statute disallows any injunction stemming from a labor dis-
pute, and then defines labor dispute as “any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employ-
ment . . . regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and 
employee.” Id. §§ 101, 113. Section two and three of the Norris-LaGuardia Act protect against yel-
low-dog contracts by establishing an employee has an uninfringeable right to the freedom of associa-
tion and that all promises in conflict with that policy, which would include a promise not to unionize, 
are unenforceable. Id. §§ 102–103. This Act established that in these antitrust and anti-injunction 
statutes, Congress established two distinct policies—one to protect competition in business and the 
other to maintain the rights of unions. Allen Bradley Co., 325 U.S. at 806 (explaining the workable 
relationship between the two policies). In Allen Bradley Co., the Supreme Court left some room for 
the Sherman Act to be used against unions. See id. at 810. Specifically, when a labor union acts with 
business groups to achieve their interests, here manufacturers of goods and other employers in compe-
tition with their own, this is a violation of the Sherman Act as it infringes too far on the policy of 
protecting competition. Id. at 799–800, 810. 
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Union worker’s saw another victory in July of 1935 with the passage of 
the Wagner Act, better known today as the NLRA.101 The Act ensured workers’ 
rights to join a union, to collectively bargain, and to strike.102 Importantly, the 
Wagner Act also established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to 
enforce workers’ rights.103 Congress stated that the purpose of the Act was to 
avert interruptions to commerce that occur during strikes by forcing employers 
to partake in collective bargaining with their employees.104 
B. “Either They Gives Us Our Rights or We Gives Them a War”: How the 
Decisions Leading Up to and Following NLRB v. Hearst  
Publications Defined Who Could Strike 
With federal legislation solidifying employees’ right to unionize and 
strike, the question then became who was considered an “employee” eligible 
                                                                                                                           
 101 See National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–
169); Graham Boone, Labor Law Highlights, 1915–2015, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Oct. 
2015), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2015/article/labor-law-highlights-1915-2015.htm [https://perma.
cc/5LZF-W457] (theorizing that higher compensation is the largest benefit that arose from the 
NLRA’s right to unionize). The Wagner Act was almost immediately challenged in court on the basis 
that it was an unconstitutional expansion of the commerce clause. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 
301 U.S. at 22; GORMAN, supra note 14, at 47. In fact, scholars theorize that the Wagner Act only 
passed because some legislators who voted yes never expected it to withstand Supreme Court scruti-
ny. See Julius G. Getman & Thomas C. Kohler, The Story of NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph 
Co., in LABOR LAW STORIES 13, 35 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk ed. 2005) (explaining that 
legislators who were opposed passed the bill to appease some of their voters, expecting the Supreme 
Court to nullify it). On the contrary, when the Supreme Court heard the question in 1937 in the land-
mark case N.R.L.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court moved away from its previous rulings 
and decided this kind of regulation was not an unconstitutional expansion of Congress’s enumerated 
right to regulate interstate commerce. See 301 U.S. at 37 (holding the NLRA was constitutional). 
Contra Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (nullifying Congress’s attempt to 
legislate eight-hour work days, minimum wage, and the right to collectively bargain); Child Labor 
Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 43 (1922) (ruling Congress’s attempt to regulate child labor as a tax was also 
an overstep of the right to regulate interstate commerce); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273–
74 (1918) (explaining that regulating child labor is not in the power of Congress). Some scholars be-
lieve this shift was a result of President Franklin Deleanor Roosevelt’s “court-packing plan,” or his 
plan to add more Supreme Court Justices to the bench, as the sitting Justices did not want their vote 
diluted and therefore allowed this concession. KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., LEGAL PROTEC-
TION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE 15 (5th ed. 2016). 
 102 Timeline, supra note 76; see 49 Stat. 449, § 7 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 157). 
 103 49 Stat. 449, § 3 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 153) (expressing intent and establishing the 
NLRB); see also The 1935 Passage of the Wagner Act, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-
history/1935-passage-wagner-act [https://perma.cc/3SWP-7FV3] (explaining that the NLRB was 
created because of the Wagner Act). 
 104 See 49 Stat. 449, § 1 (1935) (codified with some differences in language at 29 U.S.C. § 151). 
Industrial peace, meaning peace resulting from parties being able to bargain, is often cited as another 
purpose of the Wagner Act. See Antoine, supra note 12, at 2201–02 (explaining that some saw the 
concept of “industrial peace” as blackmail because it sounded like they were against peace at a time of 
heightened strikes). 
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for unionization and collective bargaining.105 The Wagner Act definition of an 
employee was originally very broad, defined as “any employee” who was in 
the employment of an employer.106 Because of the vagueness of the definition, 
the Newsboys of America pushed to gain rights as employees of their papers 
by virtue of law, an effort that would ultimately validate their strike.107 This 
push for clarity inadvertently helped define who is considered a legal “em-
ployee” under the Wagner Act, and thus who is permitted to organize and to 
bargain collectively.108 
For years, courts struggled with how to identify the Newsboys.109 Most of 
the cases focused on the common law element of control over the Newsboys’ 
actions to see if the Newsboys could be deemed employees as opposed to in-
                                                                                                                           
 105 See Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. at 120; KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., LABOR LAW IN THE 
CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE 111 (2006) (explaining who is an employee under the NLRA) [herein-
after DAU-SCHMIDT, CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE]. 
 106 49 Stat. 449, § 2(3) (codified with some differences in language at 29 U.S.C § 152(3)). The 
term mainly defines who is an employee in the negative, in the earliest version excluding agricultural 
laborers, those who worked in domestic households, or those employed by their immediate family. 
See id. 
 107 See Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. at 132 (addressing, at the Supreme Court, the question of whether 
a Newsboy is an employee). 
 108 See id. (deciding if Newsboys could participate in collective bargaining); Hampton v. Macon 
News Printing Co., 12 S.E.2d 425, 425 (Ga. Ct. App. 1940) (arising out of tort claim trying to prove 
the Newsboy was an employee subjecting the company to vicarious liability); Charles H. Koch & 
Richard Murphy, Review Administrative Interpretations of Law, 4 ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 11:32 (3d ed. 
2018) (showing N.L.R.B v. Hearst Publications’ prominence, even in the modern day); see infra notes 
109–132 and accompanying text for a discussion on the Newsboys legal push towards validation as 
employees. 
 109 See Globe Indem. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 284 P. 661, 661 (Cal. 1930) (evaluating 
whether an injury occurred in the scope of employment or if the Newsboy was independent); Press 
Publ’g Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 210 P. 820, 821 (Cal. 1922) (deciding whether a Newsboy 
was an employee for workplace injury compensation purposes); Hampton, 12 S.E.2d at 425 (deciding 
whether a Newsboy who negligently caused an accident with his motorcycle while delivering news-
papers was an employee and extending liability to the employer); Greening v. Gazette Printing Co., 88 
P.2d 862, 863 (Mont. 1939) (determining whether a news carrier was an employee or independent 
contractor in a tort case). In both Globe Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission and Press 
Publishing Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, the California Supreme Court took on the question 
of if under the state law definition, a Newsboy was an employee and, in both situations, ruled they 
were. Globe Indem. Co., 284 P. at 662; Press Publ’g Co., 210 P. at 823. The dissent in Hampton at-
tempted to differentiate the facts of Globe Indemnity Co. and Press Publishing Co. by saying that the 
method of payment was a crucial factor, and in the latter two cases the boys were paid a regular sum 
in addition to keeping the difference in what they sell. See Hampton, 12 S.E.2d at 432–33 (Sutton, J., 
dissenting) (differentiating the facts of the aforementioned cases); see also Globe Indem. Co., 284 P. 
at 661 (explaining how the Newsboy was given three dollars a month in addition to paying per 100 
papers); Press Publ’g Co., 210 P. at 823 (noting that the Newsboy was paid weekly). The Supreme 
Court of California seemed to agree with that theory a year following its prior decision in Globe In-
demnity Co. when it said in dicta in New York Indemnity Co. that the facts were not analogous because 
in Globe Indemnity Co. the employee was getting a regular sum of money. Compare N.Y. Indem. Co. 
v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 1 P.2d 12, 14 (Cal. 1931) (holding a Newsboy is not an employee), with 
Globe Indem. Co., 284 P. at 661 (finding that a Newsboy is an employee). 
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dependent contractors for vicarious liability in tort cases.110 The common law 
control test asks if the employer has enough power in the worker’s actions to 
directly manage him or her.111 A few courts, however, like the Supreme Court 
of Washington in Wilson v. Times Printing Co. in 1930, focused on elements 
beyond control, weighing them more or less equally.112 Specifically, the court 
did not emphasize control but considered it as another factor.113 
The Newsboys legal efforts culminated in 1944 in a landmark Supreme 
Court case, NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.114 In Hearst Publications, the 
Supreme Court in 1944 questioned if the Newsboys could lawfully require 
their employers to engage in collective bargaining with them.115 The main is-
sue, as noted by the court in Hearst Publications, was defining “employee.”116 
In analyzing the Wagner Act’s definition of “employee,” the Court noted that 
                                                                                                                           
 110 See, e.g., N.Y. Indem. Co., 1 P.2d at 14 (focusing on employer’s control over Newsboy to 
determine whether a Newsboy is an employee under state law); Globe Indem. Co., 284 P. at 662 (fo-
cusing on employer’s control over Newsboy to determine whether a Newsboy is an employee under a 
state workplace compensation statute); Hampton, 12 S.E.2d at 427 (focusing on employer’s control 
over a Newsboy to determine employer’s vicarious liability); Greening, 88 P.2d at 867 (same). A few 
cases analyzed the issue not from the view of the common law, but rather the view of Workmen’s 
Compensation, but also ended up focusing in on the common law element of control to determine who 
is an employee. See Birmingham Post Co. v. Sturgeon, 149 So. 74, 79–80 (Ala. 1933) (holding that a 
Newsboy is not an employee); N.Y. Indem. Co., 1 P.2d at 14 (ruling a Newsboy was an independent 
contractor); Creswell v. Charlotte News Publ’g Co., 168 S.E. 408, 409 (N.C. 1933) (holding a News-
boy is not an employee); Balinski v. Press Pub. Co., 179 A. 897, 899 (Pa. 1935) (holding that the 
Newsboys were not employees). Courts also relied on the parties’ definition of the relationship in 
contract, but when there was no contract, or the contract was unclear, courts seemed to be split on if a 
Newsboy could be considered an independent contractor or employee. See N.Y. Indem. Co., 1 P.2d at 
14; Globe Indem. Co., 284 P. at 662; Press Publ’g Co., 210 P. at 823; Hampton, 12 S.E.2d at 425; 
Greening, 88 P.2d at 867. The Supreme Court of Montana in Greening v. Gazette Printing Co., using 
the control test, ruled that the Newsboy in question was not an employee, but did so by analyzing the 
terms of his contract and noting that the contract left to him the choices regarding his deliveries and 
control of his work. 88 P.2d at 867. 
 111 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958 AM. LAW INST.) (setting out the common 
law restatement test for “servant,” or employee); Control, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(defining control as “direct or indirect” rights to control management of a worker and/or the ability to 
have oversight and direct or manage a person). 
 112 Wilson v. Times Printing Co., 290 P. 691, 693 (Wash. 1930) (taking into consideration control 
as well as length of time expected for the work, if the salary statement was formal, the actual contract, 
the manner and means of how he carried out the work, etc.). 
 113 See id. (considering control as a factor to determine whether the Newsboys were employees). 
 114 Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. at 111, 113; see DAU-SCHMIDT, supra note 101, at 28 (explaining that 
Hearst Publications was the first time the Court analyzed the scope and reach of the NLRA); GOR-
MAN, supra note 14, at 61 (citing Hearst Publications as crucial to the history of the differentiation of 
independent contractors and employees under the NLRA); § 11:32 Review Administrative Interpreta-
tions of Law, 4 ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 11:32 (3d ed.) (illustrating Hearst Publications’ modern-day 
implications). 
 115 Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. 111, 113.The newspapers in question were The Los Angeles Times, 
The Los Angeles Examiner, and The Los Angeles Evening Herald and Express. Id. at 115. Hearst 
owned most of the newspapers in question. Id. 
 116 Id. at 120. 
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because Congress used broad terminology, the Court must look to the common 
law definition.117 The problem was, as the Court points out, that even the 
common law definition is unclear.118 
Under the common law of agency, the test suggests that a worker is an 
employee if the employer has a sufficient amount of control over the worker’s 
actions.119 The common law also has other factors to help determine if an agent 
is an employee, such as if the employee is in a distinct business or occupation, 
if that occupation is typically under the direction of an employer, the skill in-
volved, who supplies the equipment, the amount of time employed, how the 
agent is paid, if the work is in the regular business, and what type of relation-
ship the parties believed was created at the time.120 
The Court in Hearst Publications was reluctant to apply state-based 
common law to a federal statute.121 Their concern was that the definition must 
be read with thought to the federal statute’s purpose, meaning federal statutes 
interpret “employee” differently statute to statute.122 Seeing that the Wagner 
Act did not exclude independent contractors, the Court noted that independent 
contractors are also susceptible to the harms that come from an inability to col-
lectively bargain and therefore fall into the definition of employee under the 
Wagner Act.123 Therefore, they held that if the economic realities of independ-
ent contractors are such that without bargaining power or unions they do not 
have the opportunity to deal fairly with their employers, they should fall under 
the protections of the statute.124 
                                                                                                                           
 117 Id. The Court explains that this area of the law comes from tort, in deciding when an employer 
has vicarious liability to its employee. Id. at 121. This is well-illustrated in an earlier case regarding 
Newsboys, Hampton v. Macon News Printing Co. See 12 S.E.2d at 425 (relying on common law doc-
trines to decide that Newsboys are employees). In that case, a Newsboy delivering newspapers by 
motorcycle was in an automobile accident in which the plaintiff sustained injuries. Id. The Georgia 
Court of Appeals in 1940 held that, using the common law standards with a focus on who has control 
of the alleged employee’s action, the Newsboy was not necessarily an independent contractor, but 
could reasonably be deemed an employee. Id. at 431–32. Their test for control is if the boys would 
have listened if the company gave them instructions, and they found without a clear contract stating 
the Newsboy is independent, they are not. Id. at 427. 
 118 See Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. at 122 (explaining that there is no uniformity of definition). The 
Court also takes issue with the fact that most common law is made on a state by state basis, and the 
Wagner Act is federal law, making it difficult to merge the two. Id. at 122–23, 125. 
 119 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (2006 AM. LAW INST.) (defining an employ-
ee as “an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and means of the 
agent’s performance of work”). 
 120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (outlining ten factors to help determine if an 
agent is an employee or an independent contractor). 
 121 See Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. at 122–23. 
 122 Id. at 127. 
 123 Id. 
 124 See id. at 128–29 (explaining that employee should be broadly interpreted). The Court held 
that the statute is written for a “broad” purpose and as such should be read broadly, without considera-
tion of other legal classifications. Id. at 129. The Court declined to explicitly define the term “employ-
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With respect to the Newsboys, the Court noted that the publishers dictated 
their prices, prescribed their hours, provided much of their equipment, and 
profited off the benefits of their sales.125 As such, the Court held with the 
NLRB that the Newsboys were in fact employees.126 The Court did, however, 
provide the caveat that “temporary” or “seasonal” Newsboys must be excluded 
from collective bargaining as they did not fit the definition.127 
In the wake of the Hearst Publications decision, Congress decided to re-
balance the powers between unions and employers.128 Congress, therefore, 
passed the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, an amendment to the Wagner Act, which 
enumerated fair practices of unions, solidified that joining a union was a 
choice, and importantly, excluded supervisors and independent contractors 
from those who could unionize.129 The Taft-Hartley Act’s restrictions made the 
                                                                                                                           
ee,” leaving that determination for the business of the NLRB. Id. at 130. The Court, therefore, holds 
that it should defer to the NLRB if the NLRB’s decision is reasonable. Id. at 131. 
 125 Id. at 131. While the newspapers did not directly control their hours, the determination of 
when the papers are sold to the Newsboys for circulation determined when they needed to work if 
they wished to make a profit. See id. (concluding that the employers dictate their working hours). 
 126 Id. at 132. 
 127 See id. The court explained that part-time Newsboys are those that work less than five days a 
week or sell less than five editions daily. Id. at 132. Temporary or seasonal Newsboys sell for thirty 
consecutive days or less. Id. 
 128 CHAISON, supra note 77, at 13. See generally Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. at 111–37. The decision 
was also due to the increase in unions and strikes after the passage of the NLRA. CHAISON, supra 
note 77, at 13; see H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 4 (1947) (citing the increase of strikes as evidence of the 
need for the “Labor-Management Relations Act,” now better known as the Taft-Hartley Act). For 
example, during World War II unions agreed to a “no strike pledge.” CHAISON, supra note 77, at 13. 
The United Mine Workers ignored that pledge when they went on strike in 1943 to try and get higher 
wages. See id.; Peter Kihss, Seizure of Mines, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 1978), http://www.nytimes.com/
1978/03/06/archives/seizure-of-mines-seizure-by-truman-steel-plants-returned.html [https://perma.
cc/RTN5-A8HE] (explaining that the president of the United Mine Workers announced that he was 
not bound to the no-strike agreement). In response, President Roosevelt seized the mines. Kihss, su-
pra. Even with this government intervention, the miners did succeed in receiving wage increases, but 
there was still another strike in 1945. See id. This time, President Truman seized the mines, and a 
federal judge fined the union for violating the injunction. Id. These efforts would later lead to the 
Supreme Court case Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, where the Court addressed if presidents 
had the constitutional authority to conduct this type of seizure. See 343 U.S. 579, 582, 589 (1952) 
(holding that the President did not have the authority and therefore the seizure was wrongful). After 
the war, paired with the renewed vigor that unions brought to strikes post-war and post no-strike 
agreement, Congress decided to decrease the growing power of unions. See CHAISON, supra note 77, 
at 13. 
 129 See Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified with some differences in language at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 141–197) (amending the NLRA); NLRB. v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968) 
(noting that the Act was passed in part due to Congress’s dislike of the decision in Hearst Publica-
tions). The Act was also known as the Labor Management Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 141; H.R. 
REP. No. 80-245, at 1 (referring to the act as such). Unions denounced the act as the “slave-labor act.” 
See Jack Barbash, Chapter 6 Unions and Rights in the Space Age, DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.
gov/general/aboutdol/history/chapter6 [https://perma.cc/UW9K-8L92] (explaining that the act banned 
certain types of strikes, such as secondary boycotts). The law ensured that unions and employers both 
had the same rules to bargain in good faith. 1947 Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions, NLRB, https://
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NLRA a statute at war with itself in that many of its pro unionization aspects 
were now restricted.130 
When the issue of how to classify an employee was addressed again at the 
Supreme Court twenty-three years later in NLRB v. United Insurance Co., the 
Court held that due to the Taft-Hartley Act, the proper standard was that from 
the common law of agency.131 Today, the definition of an employee is still 
murky, which has led to a multitude of problems in the employment sphere.132 
C. “They Think They’re Running This Town but This Town Would Shut 
Down Without Us”: The Modern Trend Towards Independent Contractors 
Due to limitation of who is an employee, as well as other distinction is-
sues, one study estimated that of the American workforce, only about 43% of 
workers are within the jurisdiction of the NLRA.133 This is due, in part, to em-
ployers’ trend towards relying on actual or misclassified independent contrac-
tors rather than employees.134 “Misclassified” workers are those who are clas-
                                                                                                                           
www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-history/1947-taft-hartley-substantive-provisions [https://perma.cc/
ES84-5R3S] (adding that this reflected Congress’s thoughts that unions needed more oversight). Con-
gress, in their House Committee Report on the bill, directly chastised the Court in Hearst Publications 
for expanding the definition of employee, in Congress’s view, well beyond its common law definition. 
See H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 18 (explaining that the Court gave far too much deference to the board); 
GORMAN, supra note 14, at 62 (explaining that in passing the Taft-Hartley amendments Congress 
wanted to narrow the Act and the Board’s jurisdiction in response to Hearst Publications). This exclu-
sion of supervisors has created a situation where, during a strike, they must act as “scabs,” even if they 
are sympathetic to the union, and either work the jobs the workers would have done or train tempo-
rary/permanent replacements. See JULIUS G. GETMAN, THE SUPREME COURT ON UNIONS 141 (2016) 
(noting that in most strikes, the supervisors are sympathetic to the union, yet they are not under the 
jurisdiction of the NLRA so cannot help or participate without fear of retaliation). 
 130 See HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 
659–61 (1950) (explaining that the Act confused the system rather than clarified it). The bill, when 
proposed to Congress, was promulgated by supporters as a fair bill meant to alleviate the “abuses” of 
the labor law while protecting the individual employees. Id. at 371–72. The opposition, however, 
attacked it as being business heavy and completely in the interest of the employers. See id. at 372 
(explaining statements made during the discussion of the bill by the majority). Legislative history on 
the bill is slim for as large an issue as it was, presumably due to Congress’s “indecent rush” to pass 
the legislation and the defeatist mindset of the minority. See id. at 372–74 (analyzing the swift debate 
on the bill). 
 131 United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 256. The Court noted that the common law presents a lot of diffi-
culty in cases where it is unclear how to classify the alleged employee. Id. at 258. 
 132 See id. at 258 (reflecting the Court’s most recent decision on the issue); infra notes 133–144 
and accompanying text. 
 133 See GORMAN, supra note 14, at 57. 
 134 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2015-1, at 1 (July 15, 
2015), http://www.fissuredworkplace.net/assets/Administrator_Interpretation_on_Misclassification_
2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8YS-8QR6] [hereinafter Weil, Administrator’s Interpretation] (identify-
ing a growth in misclassified employees in the United States today); DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED 
WORKPLACE 8–9 (2014) (explaining that recent trends have created a “fissured workplace,” or a 
workplace where workers are at an arm’s length); Testimony of Natwar M. Gandhi, Clarifying the 
Status of Independent Contractors—Part II: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Small Business, 
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sified as independent contractors when they are more properly employees.135 
This is possible because of the lack of clarity within the definition of employ-
ee.136 Employers have trended towards use of these independent contractors, 
both actual and misclassified, because of different benefits they receive due to 
this classification, such as freedom from certain employee labor benefits and 
tax benefits.137 There are also a variety of reasons why a worker might prefer 
an independent contractor status, such as greater control over work schedules 
                                                                                                                           
104th Cong. at 5 (1995) (explaining that misclassification is in all industries and in some industries is 
as high as 20% of employees); Katz & Krueger, supra note 16, at 1 (citing a significant increase in “al-
ternative work arrangements,” which includes independent contracting, from 2005–2015). The Depart-
ment of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division issued a nonpartisan statement on misclassification and how to 
avoid it in 2015, but when the new administration took over in 2017, the Department withdrew the doc-
ument. Compare Weil, Administrator’s Interpretation, supra, at 1 (issuing guidance on misclassifica-
tion), with U.S. Dep’t of Labor, US Secretary of Labor Withdraws Joint Employment, Independent 
Contractor Informal Guidance, Release No. 17-0807-NAT (June 7, 2017), https://www.dol.gov/
newsroom/releases/opa/opa20170607 [https://perma.cc/PA9T-4BXX] (withdrawing the administrative 
guidance). While misclassification is popular in a lot of industries, including construction, houseclean-
ing, in-home care, trucking, a growing concern is its use in the digital platform economy, commonly 
referred to as the “gig economy.” See Weil, Why It Matters, supra note 16. (discussing misclassification 
in the gig economy); Francoise Carre, (In)Dependent Contractor Misclassification, ECON. POL’Y INST. 
2 (June 8, 2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/independent-contractor-misclassification/ [https://
perma.cc/ZU82-D79B] (listing the previously indicated industries as the most common industries of 
misclassification). Although this is a growing concern, only 1% of people currently work in the gig 
economy. Weil, Why It Matters, supra note 16. 
 135 U. S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO 09-717, Employee Misclassification: Improved Co-
ordination, Outreach, and Targeting Could Better Ensure Detection and Prevention 3 (Aug. 10, 2009), 
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-717 [https://perma.cc/F9JR-QXSW] [hereinafter Employee 
Misclassification] (defining employee misclassification and explaining that the tests to differentiate an 
employee from an independent contractor are “complex” and unclear). While federally, misclassifica-
tion suits will typically just result in remedial measures, in some states misclassification can lead to 
criminal and civil liability. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.  ch. 149, § 148(B)(d) (West 2004) (mak-
ing misclassification in Massachusetts punishable by civil and criminal remedies and by disbarment). 
Contra Employee Misclassification, supra, at 19 (explaining in cases under the FLSA, the Wage and 
Hour Division of the Department of Labor can only seek remedial measures for “willful or repeated” 
misclassifications). As a result, in 2008, the Department of Labor only enforced penalties in under 2% 
of cases. Employee Misclassification, supra, at 19 (reflecting 2 of 131 investigations). 
 136 See United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 258 (attempting to define employee); Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. 
at 120 (reflecting the Court’s first attempt at defining employee); Weil, Why It Matters, supra note 16 
(explaining the problem of misclassification due to the ambiguous terminology). 
 137 See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (limiting the Fair Labor Standards Act grant of 
minimum wage to employees); National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (limiting the right 
to strike and collectively bargain in the NLRA to employees); Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (signifying that only employees get retirement benefits); Weil, 
Administrator’s Interpretation, supra note 134, at 1 (explaining that misclassified employees’ em-
ployers do not pay overtime, unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, and minimum wage); 
Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 989, 1020 (2016) (cit-
ing TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, REF. NO. 2013-30-058, EMPLOY-
ERS DO NOT ALWAYS FOLLOW INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE WORKER DETERMINATION RULING 2 
(2013) (“The IRS estimates that employers misclassify millions of workers as independent contractors 
instead of employees . . . allow[ing] employers to avoid paying a significant amount of money in 
employment taxes.”) [hereinafter Oei & Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?]. 
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and certain tax incentives.138 The National Bureau of Economic Research in a 
2016 study estimates that the shift resulted in an almost 40% increase in inde-
pendent contracting, from 6.9% in 2005 to 8.4% in 2015.139 One commentator 
found, by analyzing a number of studies, that around 10–20% of employers 
misclassify at least one employee as an independent contractor.140 
Even though workers see some benefit from this classification, both the 
employee and society can suffer from this misclassification.141 Most obviously, 
if they are deemed independent contractors, employees cannot receive certain 
labor benefits.142 Furthermore, even though one of the major incentives of be-
ing an independent contractor is flexibility, many are unable to work for other 
                                                                                                                           
 138 See KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOY-
EE 51 (4th ed. 2011) [hereinafter DAU-SCHMIDT, LEGAL PROTECTION 4TH ED.] (explaining that both 
employers and employees may be interested in the flexibility of independent contracting). Some em-
ployees like the freedom the classification gives them, but others accept or stay at the job because 
other work is difficult to find or does not exist. Id. One tax incentive for employees is the avoidance of 
employment taxes. Oei & Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, supra note 137, at 1020. Another incentive 
under the 2017 tax plan is that it allows independent contractors a 20% deduction. See 26 U.S.C. 
§ 199A (2018); Oei & Ring, supra note 16, at 1 (explaining that the market is concerned this will 
create incentives for employers to classify their workers as independent contractors). 
 139 Katz & Krueger, supra note 16, at 9 (announcing the data); Weil, Why It Matters, supra note 
16 (analyzing the data). 
 140 Carre, supra note 134, at 1 (asserting that many studies have found this to be true). 
 141 See Employee Misclassification, supra note 135, at 1, 4, 10 (outlining some of the benefits and 
losses of misclassification); Weil, Why It Matters, supra note 16 (discussing the negative implications 
of misclassification). Misclassification, on the employee side, is commonly associated with a loss of 
wages. Weil, Why It Matters supra note 16 (citing a case in Chicago where fifty-five workers had 
wage theft of $185,000 due to misclassification). Society loses out when this misclassification hap-
pens through loss of taxes, like payroll taxes. See id.; Investigation in Utah and Arizona Secures Wag-
es and Benefits for More Than 1,000 Construction Workers Who Were Wrongly Classified, U.S. 
DEP’T OF LAB. (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/whd/whd20150518 [https://
perma.cc/EQ2Y-AVRA] [hereinafter Investigation in Utah and Arizona] (quoting the U.S. Secretary 
of Labor at the time, Thomas E. Perez, who noted that misclassification forces other taxpayers to 
compensate for those who broke the law in misclassifying). The IRS’s most recent study of misclassi-
fication for the tax year of 1984 suggested an estimated loss of $1.6 billion (in 1984 dollars) due to a 
misclassification of around 3.4 million employees by 15% of employers. Employee Misclassification, 
supra note 135, at 10. 
 142 See Employee Misclassification, supra note 135, at 5–6 (listing the laws/benefits employers 
attempt to avoid through misclassification); e.g., National Labor Relations Act § 7 (giving the right to 
organize and collectively bargain to employees); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (denying 
nonemployees the right to minimum wage under the FLSA); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 12112 (2012) (limiting the rule against discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act to job applicants or employees). Recently, however, an administrative judge of the NLRB con-
cluded that the mere act of misclassifying an employee is itself a violation of the NLRA as it is an 
unlawful constraint on an employee’s right to join a union. Velox Express, Inc., 2017 NLRB LEXIS 
486, *33 (N.L.R.B. Sept. 25, 2017) (ruling that the misclassification of employees can by itself be a 
violation of the NLRA). At the time of publication of this Note, the company has filed an appeal with 
the NLRB. Velox Express, Inc., 2018 NLRB LEXIS 92, *1 (N.L.R.B. Feb. 15, 2018) (requesting 
briefs be submitted); Lawrence E. Dube & Hassan A. Kanu, So You Told Your Employees They’re 
Contractors. Was That Wrong?, BLOOMBERG LAW (May 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/GCG7-UP4Y 
(explaining that the NLRBs decision on this case will be the first of its kind and its ramifications). 
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companies because of loyalty or non-compete agreements143 Employers, on the 
other hand, prefer this misclassification because it increases their competitive 
advantage by decreasing labor costs and tax costs.144 
III. “JUST LOOK AROUND AT THE WORLD WE’RE INHERITING AND  
THINK OF THE ONE WE’LL CREATE”: HOW TO DEFINE AN  
EMPLOYEE FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
The right to unionize and collectively bargain has been recognized in 
American law in numerous contexts.145 That right, however, is only given to 
workers who fit within the unclear definition of “employee” under the 
NLRA.146 Section A of this Part explains who is deemed as an “employee” un-
der the NLRA.147 Section B discusses the different tests courts have used to try 
and clarify this distinction.148 Section C discusses the effect such classifica-
tions have on the right to strike.149 Finally, Section D returns to the starting 
question of this paper: is a Newsboy an employee or an independent contrac-
tor?150 
                                                                                                                           
 143 See LANCE COMPA, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS’ FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 184 (2004) (using the example 
of truck driver to explain their required non-compete agreements and quoting one worker who said 
“we are like slaves . . . to the big companies”). In some industries, there has been a similar movement 
to misclassification where employers have forced their employees to become “owner-operators.” Id. at 
182 (specifically analyzing the trucking, agriculture, and construction industries). This is where the 
employer forces the former employees to become “self-employed,” giving them the semblance of 
flexibility, when in actuality this forces them to do the same job as before for presumably less money. 
Id. They also must take on the costs and risks associated with ownership and fund their own insurance 
and benefits. Id. If they try to organize, they can be liable for an anti-trust violation. Id. 
 144 DAU-SCHMIDT, supra note 101, at 51; Investigation in Utah and Arizona, supra note 141. 
 145 See Norris-LaGuardia Act § 2, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (asserting that the 
individual worker’s right to freedom of association and bargaining should be uninfringed); NLRB. v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937) (explaining that the right to organize and bargain 
collectively is a fundamental right); COMPA, supra note 143, at 13 (noting that the right comes from 
the fundamental right of the freedom of association); DAU-SCHMIDT, CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE, 
supra note 105, at 55 (describing the right to organize as fundamental). The language of the NLRA 
itself suggests this in its prefatory language in section one of the Act, when it explains that it is the 
stance of the United States that the country should protect the freedom of association and self-
organization for the rights to bargain in the employment sphere. See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 
29 U.S.C. § 151. 
 146 See National Labor Relations Act § 2(3) (defining employee for the scope of the NLRA); 
National Labor Relations Act § 7 (giving employees the right to self-organization). The NLRA gives 
all employees the rights to organize, bargain, and engage in “concerted activities,” not just employees 
who are unionized. See National Labor Relations Act § 7. That protected right, however, extends only 
to employees. See id. 
 147 See infra notes 151–170 and accompanying text. 
 148 See infra notes 171–187 and accompanying text. 
 149 See infra notes 188–209 and accompanying text. 
 150 See infra notes 210–220 and accompanying text. 
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A. “I Never Planned on Someone Like You”: The Common Law Employee 
After the passage of labor laws, if the Newsboys wanted to make a union, 
the process would be much more complicated than simply, “saying so.”151 The 
proposed union would have to organize, ensure they could get a majority of the 
vote of their proposed unit, and either ask their employer for recognition or 
petition the NLRB for union status.152 The NLRB would then face an interest-
ing question—is a Newsboy an employee or an independent contractor?153 
The NLRA defines an employee as an employee who is not an independ-
ent contractor.154 In this way, the definition of an employee is cyclical—an 
employee is an employee.155 If an employer can prove that its worker is an in-
dependent contractor, it is freed from the obligation of collective bargaining.156 
In the same way the statute does not help in defining an employee, however, 
the statute also neglects to define independent contractor.157 Courts have de-
cided that Congress must have intended to use the colloquial, well-known 
meaning of the terms employee and independent contractor.158 The problem 
then becomes how broadly to interpret the terms.159 
                                                                                                                           
 151 NEWSIES, supra note 1 (singing “we’re a union just by saying so”); see National Labor Rela-
tions Act § 2(3) (defining employee). 
 152 See National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), (c)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), (c)(1)(A). See general-
ly William E. Fulmer, Step by Step Through a Union Campaign, 59 HARV. BUS. REV. 94 (1981) (ex-
plaining the process of gaining recognition as a union). 
 153 See National Labor Relations Act § 2(3) (excluding independent contractors from the defini-
tion of “employee”). 
 154 Id. In relevant part, the definition states that “the term ‘employee’ shall include any employee 
. . . but shall not include . . . any individual having the status of an independent contractor.” Id. Also, 
notably disqualified from the definition of employee is any form of supervisor. See id. (declining to 
extend employee status to supervisors). This was also excluded through the Taft-Hartley Amendments 
in response to a Supreme Court decision in 1947, Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, in which the 
Court recognized foremen as employees. See 330 U.S. 485, 490 (1947) (recognizing foremen but not 
supervisors as employees); GORMAN, supra note 14, at 67 (citing S. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., Sess. 
1st (1947)). Unlike independent contractors, however, section fourteen of the NLRA’s language still 
allows supervisors to become or remain members of unions, but an employer does not have to recog-
nize a union solely made up of supervisors. National Labor Relations Act § 14, 29 U.S.C. § 164. 
 155 See National Labor Relations Act § 2(3). 
 156 See id. § 7 (giving the right to unionize, collectively bargain, etc. to “employees”). By nega-
tive inference, one who is not an employee has no such rights. See id. 
 157 See id. § 2 (listing definitions for purposes of the NLRA). 
 158 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989) (finding that Con-
gress meant for “employee” to be defined by common rules of agency); NLRB. v. United Ins. Co., 
390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968) (explaining that Congress must have meant for the court to use “general 
agency principles”); United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713, 720 (1947) (noting that the word em-
ployee still has much uncertainty); Respondeat Superior, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(defining respondeat superior). The test is derived from respondeat superior claims in tort. Packard 
Motor Car Co., 330 U.S. at 489; NLRB. v. Hearst Publ’n, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 120–21 (1944) (noting 
that it took years of uncertainty to establish a “test” in tort for this differentiation); Hargrove v. 
Sleepy’s, LLC., 106 A.3d 449, 464 (N.J. 2015) (explaining that the test was made for tort cases). 
 159 See Silk, 331 U.S. at 713 (citing Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. 111) (finding that there is no easy 
way to define employee). 
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First, courts and scholars have struggled with whether the word “employ-
ee” should be interpreted the same way in every statute.160 One school of 
thought holds that the word employee has a common law definition with a set 
meaning and a large body of precedent, and thus there is more clarity when it 
is used uniformly in all federal legislation.161 This argument is premised on the 
notion that when a word in a statute is left undefined, Congress must have in-
tended to use the well-known tests and implications associated with that 
word.162 The other side of the argument believes, because each statute is 
passed for a different purpose and social policy, defining the word in the same 
way in every single federal statute would ignore congressional intent.163 
                                                                                                                           
 160 See ARTHUR LARSON ET AL., Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 60.01 (2017) (explain-
ing that the difference in the definition of the term varies statute to statute based on the statutes’ in-
tent); see, e.g., Weil, Administrator’s Interpretation, supra note 134, at 1–2 (explaining that the 
FLSA’s definition of employee is broader due to the language of the statute and its subsequent 
caselaw). 
 161 See LARSON, supra note 160, § 60.04 (explaining that the “conventional” thought is to assume 
that every piece of legislation using the term employee intends to adopt the definition created through 
vicarious liability case law). The Court in United Insurance Co. arguably adopted this view in respect 
to the NLRA when it used the common law agency test’s elements. See 390 U.S. at 256 (using the 
common law agency doctrine to determine whether someone is an employee). This view seems to be 
the current Supreme Court approach, with the Court noting in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Darden in 1992 that, although Congress’s amendments after cases like Hearst Publications does not 
divest the Judiciary of its power to interpret the law, the contextual approach no longer holds true after 
so many congressional amendments implying legislative intent otherwise. See 503 U.S. 318, 324–25 
(1992) (noting that “a principle of statutory construction can endure just so many legislative revisita-
tions”); Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. at 132 (deciding who is an employee before the Taft-Hartley 
amendments). They note this is especially true after the Supreme Court in Community for Creative 
Non-Violence v. Reid in 1989 adopted the common law agency test, seemingly abandoning the context 
argument, even though in that same opinion the Court struggled with how the test needs to fit contex-
tual history of copyright law. Darden, 503 U.S. at 325; see Reid, 490 U.S. at 740–41 (noting that the 
common law control test does not fit within the purpose of the statute, but the broad uniform restate-
ment test seems to). Still, this approach is not used uniformly in every statute. See Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e), (g) (defining “employee” and “employ” in the FLSA); Weil, Adminis-
trator’s Interpretation, supra note 134, at 1–2 (explaining the definitions in the FLSA). In the FLSA, 
for example, the language for employee in the statute is interpreted much more broadly, and thus they 
do not use the same interpretation of employee as the NLRA. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 203(e), (g); Weil, Administrator’s Interpretation, supra note 134, at 1–2 (explaining the FLSA’s 
interpretation in comparison to other statutes’ interpretation). 
 162 See LARSON, supra note 160, § 60.04 (explaining that the definition of employee would build 
off of vicarious liability caselaw). 
 163 See Reid, 490 U.S. at 741 (holding petitioner’s use of the common law test did not fit with the 
language of the statute before them); Silk, 331 U.S. at 712 (holding the words must be viewed in con-
text with the larger legislation); Packard Motor Car Co., 330 U.S. at 489 (explaining Congress, when 
writing the NLRA, could not ensure courts would use the common law and did not mean them to 
because of the broad language and the context); Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. at 120–21 (holding that in an 
employment context the word employee must be broader); D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co., 927 
A.2d 112, 120 (N.J. 2007) (acknowledging the need for a determination to be made in light of the 
social purpose of the legislation). 
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The second problem is how to apply state-created common law on the 
federal level.164 Because the classification of who is an employee stems from 
state tort claims, the interpretation can vary by state.165 The Supreme Court in 
Hearst Publications used this issue as a basis for rejecting the common law 
test because they worried about the distinction becoming dependent on what 
jurisdiction a case was brought in, as opposed to a uniform application of the 
federal law.166 Then, in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid in 1988, 
the Court, concerned about state common law of agency infiltrating federal 
statutes, impressed the need for a uniform federal rule of agency.167 Reid sug-
gests using the Restatement’s Agency test as the federal standard, looking to-
wards all factors in a balancing, fact reliant test, which the Court also adopted 
for the NLRA in NLRB v. United Insurance Co.168 Even though the standard 
now seems to be a unified federal Restatement test, there is merit to the con-
cern raised in Hearst Publications as more courts either expand and change the 
Restatement test or use other tests they deem more proper, often based on state 
interpretations.169 As it stands, federal statutes that leave the term “employee” 
undefined seem to all use different tests and interpret the word slightly differ-
ently statute to statute.170 
                                                                                                                           
 164 See Reid, 490 U.S. at 740. Economist David Weil mentions this issue in an article, explaining 
workers and employees are often left perplexed when trying to differentiate how they should define 
employee when it is used differently in state and federal law. Weil, Why It Matters, supra note 16 
(asserting that the definition is different in different federal laws). 
 165 See DAU-SCHMIDT, LEGAL PROTECTION 4TH ED., supra note 138, at 28 (explaining that the 
common law test stems from respondeat superior claims in tort, or the notion that an employer is at 
fault if their employee commits a tort in the regular scope of work); Legal Information Institute, Re-
spondeat Superior, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/respondeat_superior 
[https://perma.cc/3R35-W42M] (explaining that each state varies slightly in their interpretations of 
respondeat superior). 
 166 Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. at 122–23. 
 167 Reid, 490 U.S. at 740. Reid looked at the word employee in a case arising from the Copyright 
Act of 1976 to see if an artist hired to create a statute is an employee although the term is undefined in 
the statute. Id. at 732. 
 168 See id. at 740; United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 259; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 
(1958 AM. LAW INST.). Most courts seem to agree with this interpretation. See, e.g., Darden, 503 U.S. 
at 323 (citing Reid, 490 U.S. at 751–52) (holding the analysis requires a “general,” or federal common 
law interpretation as opposed to a state common law interpretation); United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 259 
(applying the Restatement factors to determine if debit agents are independent contractors); FedEx 
Home Delivery v. NLRB, 849 F.3d 1123, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (FedEx II) (using the Restatement 
factors to rule FedEx Drivers independent contractors). 
 169 See Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. at 125–26 (asserting that creating a national standard from com-
mon law that contains “local variations” would not fit within the purpose of the Act, and thus could 
not have been what congress intended); e.g., Reid, 490 U.S. at 742 (affirming the Second Circuit’s use 
of the “actual control test” and “right to control” tests); FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 
492, 503 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (FedEx I) (explaining that the common law test has trended towards “em-
phasis to entrepreneurialism”). 
 170 See Testimony of Marshall V. Washburn, Independent Contractor Status: Hearing Before the 
House Comm. on Small Business, 104th Cong. at 2 (1995) (explaining how the common law test lacks 
clarity causing problems for businesses); Oei & Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, supra note 137, at 
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B. “Judgment Day Is Here”: Different Common Law Tests for Employees 
Courts seem to agree that the label given to a worker by an employer is 
not per se indicative of the worker’s actual status as an independent contractor 
or an employee.171 Courts must look past the label to different tests expounded 
by common law.172 While courts have rejected the pre-Taft-Hartley Hearst 
Publications reasoning due to the new amendments, it is still unclear what test 
to use to evaluate who is an employee under the NLRA.173 
The first test often used by courts to determine who is an employee under 
the NLRA is the “control test.”174 Under the “control” test, which derives from 
the common law of vicarious liability as well as the Restatement of the Law of 
Agency section 220(1), if the employer has sufficient control over the conduct 
and performance of the worker, the worker is an employee.175 The test also 
focuses on if the employer controls the “manner and means” in which an em-
ployee performs its services.176 Sometimes this test is split into the right to 
control the work product of an employee as compared to the actual control ex-
hibited by an employer.177 This test raises a legitimate concern that, if the right 
                                                                                                                           
1020 (explaining that within different areas of the legal fields, the issue is debated and treated differ-
ently). Professors Shu-Yi Oei and Diane M. Ring, both professors of tax at Boston College Law 
School, analyze at length how the interpretation of employee versus independent contractor is treated 
differently depending on the different laws being questioned. See generally id. Specifically, they look 
at the tax law and explain that the IRS uses a twenty-factor test to establish the difference between an 
employee and an independent contractor. Id. at 1021. While this test still stems from control, like the 
test in the NLRA, it has an entirely distinct set of case law and tests that could lead to a different re-
sult. See id.; Independent Contractor Defined, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/
businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/independent-contractor-defined [https://perma.cc/4ZRA-
L9WV] (explaining the general rule is the right to control test). 
 171 See FedEx I, 563 F.3d at 512–13 (Garland, J., dissenting) (explaining in the dissent that the 
contract is not indicative of the workers’ relationship, and implying it should not have even been a 
small factor in the majority’s opinion); Prudential Ins. Co., 927 A.2d at 128; Weil, Administrator’s 
Interpretation, supra note 134, at 5 (explaining that the label the employer prescribes the worker is 
not “determinative”). 
 172 See United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 256; FedEx I, 563 F.3d at 496; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 220(2) (laying out the common law factors for employee). 
 173 See Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. at 129; JULIUS G. GETMAN, THE SUPREME COURT ON UNIONS 
146 (2016) (explaining the post Hearst Publications confusion about which test to use). 
 174 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1). The Restatement, as well as much of the 
law in this area, refers to employers and employees by their old terms, “master” and “servant.” See 
Hargrove, 106 A.3d at 460 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1)) (using the term 
“servant” as a substitute for “employee”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (using the 
term “servant” in place of “employee”). 
 175 See Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. at 120, 128; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1). 
 176 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 cmt. (d) (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
 177 See Reid, 490 U.S. at 742 (holding that the copyright act does not support either test). This 
case differentiated between the “right to control” test and the “actual control” test in copyright. Id. The 
case involved a piece of art, and the right to control test looked at the relationship between the em-
ployer and the product whereas the actual control test looked at the relationship between the artist and 
the employer. Id. at 741–42. The court ended up rejecting both tests. Id. at 742. 
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to control test were mechanically adopted, employers could structure their 
workers to seem at an arm’s length so as to avoid labor laws, even though that 
worker is economically dependent on the employer and is more appropriately 
classified as an employee.178 
This concern led some courts to adopt the “economic realities test.”179 
This test is essentially the same test the Court adopted in Hearst Publica-
tions.180 In this test, the courts look to the economic dependency of the alleged 
employee to the employer.181 Because the court in United Insurance Co. ex-
pressed that the purpose of the Taft-Hartley amendments was to combat that 
reading of the statute in this broad a fashion, this test has been all but rejected 
by the Supreme Court for use under the NLRA.182 This test is more commonly 
associated with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) as the Act’s language is 
broader than that of the NLRA.183 
The Supreme Court, due to the limited analysis in the “control” test and 
the over broadness in the “economic realities test” seemed to adopt the use of 
the “common law agency” test in their opinion in United Insurance Co.184 The 
common law agency test looks at all the factors expressed by the common law 
                                                                                                                           
 178 GETMAN, supra note 173, at 146. 
 179 See Silk, 331 U.S. at 713 (adopting the economic realities test to decide who is an employee 
for purposes of Social Security); Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. at 129 (using the economic realities test to 
declare Newboys employees). 
 180 See Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. at 129 (ruling that a court should take the economic stance of the 
parties into consideration when making its determination). 
 181 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-06-656, Employment Arrangements: Improved 
Outreach Could Help Ensure Proper Worker Classification 51 (2006), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d06656.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2C3-VGJS] (defining the economic realities test). Even in relation to 
the NLRA, however, some courts often use a “hybrid” test and mix the economic realities test with the 
common law control test. Id. 
 182 See United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 256 (explaining that Taft-Hartley was passed in response to 
Hearst); Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. at 129 (holding that full time Newsboys are employees); 16 Colo. 
Prac., Employment Law & Practice Handbook § 2:15 (2017 3d ed.) [hereinafter Handbook] (explain-
ing that after the Supreme Court made the economic realities test in Hearst Publications, Congress 
denied its use in the NLRA). This means that a person could be an employee under the FLSA, giving 
her rights to benefits of employment, without being an employee under the NLRA, meaning she can-
not engage in collective bargaining or strikes. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (giving 
employees rights under the FLSA); National Labor Relations Act § 7 (giving employees rights under 
the NLRA); United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 256; Handbook, supra, § 2:15; Weil, Why It Matters, supra 
note 16. 
 183 See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e), (g) (defining “employee” as one who is 
employed by an employer and defining “employ” and “to suffer or permit to work”); United States. v. 
Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362 (1945) (explaining a broader definition of employee would be hard to 
imagine); Weil, Administrator’s Interpretation, supra note 134, at 2. In the FLSA, an employee is also 
defined cyclically like the NLRA, but the word “employ” is broadly “suffer or permit to work,” which 
courts have used to interpret an employee under the NLRA to be much broader. Darden, 503 U.S. at 
326; Weil, Administrator’s Interpretation, supra note 134, at 2; see 29 U.S.C. § 206. 
 184 See United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 256, 259 (using the common law agency test as the standard); 
FedEx I, 563 F.3d at 496 (citing United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 258) (finding. the common law agency 
test should be used as it represents congressional intent). 
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and balances the entire relationship as compared to just one factor.185 The issue 
with this factual approach is the lack of clarity it provides to parties because it 
operates on a case by case basis.186 Because of this lack of clarity, misclassifi-
cation of employees as independent contractors continues to rise.187 
C. “Too Few in Number and Too Proud to Hide”: 
Who Has the Right to Strike? 
By limiting the right to strike and collectively bargain, the law inherently 
added the idea of an “illegal strike.”188 An illegal strike occurs when a union 
breaches the unfair labor practices for unions as enacted in the Taft-Hartley 
amendments.189 Beyond those illegal strikes, the NLRA explicitly provides that 
                                                                                                                           
 185 See United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 256, 259 (analyzing whether debit agents are employees by 
looking at their independence, training, oversight, terms of employment, funding, benefits, etc.); Fed-
Ex I, 563 F.3d at 49 (holding that the proper test in light of United Insurance Co. is the common law 
agency test, which is drawn from the Restatement of Agency’s factor based test); RESTATEMENT OF 
AGENCY § 220(2) (listing the factors most commonly relied on in the common law agency test). 
These factors include control, if the worker’s occupation is distinct, if they require supervision, the 
skill involved, who supplies the tools necessary, the length of time of the work, if the worker is hourly 
or paid by project, if the work is in the normal business which the employer partakes, the parties’ 
intention in creating the relationship, and the employer’s business. RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY 
§ 220(2). 
 186 See COMPA, supra note 143, at 183 (discussing different instances of misclassification of 
employees); Weil, Why It Matters, supra note 16 (explaining this area as “complex and nuanced”). 
 187 See Weil, Why It Matters, supra note 16. 
 188 See National Labor Relations Act §§ 7, 13 (protecting employees’ rights to engage in “con-
certed activity” and strike with limitations). An unlawful strike is also known as “unprotected concert-
ed activity.” GORMAN, supra note 14, at 562–63. The Constitution, however, may also provide a 
framework for protecting the overall right to strike with both the First Amendment protecting the right 
to assemble and free speech and the Thirteenth Amendment disallowing involuntary servitude. See 
TIMOTHY J. HEINSZ ET AL., LABOR LAW: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN A FREE SOCIETY 437 (6th Ed. 
2009) (laying out the constitutional arguments for protecting strikes). There is also another Fourteenth 
Amendment argument that labor is property of the employee and that unfair negotiation power is 
deprivation of that property without just compensation or due process. See id. Further, while picketing 
is not considered pure protected speech under the First Amendment, “speech plus” arguments in con-
stitutional law may protect both picketing and boycotting. See id. Still, to date, courts have rejected 
these arguments. See id. at 438 (citing Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 206 (1928) where the Supreme 
Court said there is no “absolute right to strike”). The Supreme Court, on the other hand, ruled in 1940 
in Thornhill v. Alabama that picketing during a strike is protected activity and cannot be statutorily 
undermined. 310 U.S. 88, 101–02 (1940). 
 189 See National Labor Relations Act § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b). These unfair labor practices 
include coercing a worker to join or refrain from union activities, coercing an employer to attempt to 
discriminate against specific employees, refusing to bargain in good faith, boycotting in an attempt to 
make the employer join a labor organization, boycotting another company, recognizing a not yet certi-
fied union, forcing a worker to complete work assignments, forcing employees to pay excessive union 
fees, forcing an employer to pay for work not performed, or picketing in an attempt to instigate union-
ization without an election. Id.; see also TWOMEY, supra note 98, at 220–21 (explaining unfair union 
labor practices). Although unfair labor practice suits can be brought against both employers and un-
ions, a study in 1998 found that in that year only 172 unions were charged with a refusal to bargain, 
while 7,187 employers were charged with the same. COMPA, supra note 143, at 58. 
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no other act shall interfere with the right to strike.190 That protection, however, 
is limited to employees.191 So, even though non employees and independent 
contractors have the theoretical right to strike, they do not have a legal right to 
strike under the NLRA.192 An attempt to strike, organize, or engage in any like 
activity could potentially lead to lawful retaliation on behalf of an employer.193 
Even for those who undoubtedly have the right to unionize and strike, 
many do not out of fear of employer retaliation.194 This fear is justified by the 
fact that the law allows for temporary and permanent new hires to take the 
place of the strikers during the period of their strike.195 Further, a study in 1994 
prepared for a presidential commission on worker-management relations found 
that seventy-nine percent of those surveyed believed it was likely, very likely, 
or somewhat likely, that a nonunion worker who participated in a drive to un-
ionize would be laid off.196 
                                                                                                                           
 190 National Labor Relations Act § 13. The language reads “nothing in this act, except as specifi-
cally provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any 
way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.” Id. (emphasis add-
ed). Even “no-strike” language in a union contract may not diminish a union’s right to strike against 
unfair labor practices, so long as the actual act of striking is not an unfair labor practice. See Mastro 
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 281, 284 (1956) (ruling that although the NLRB favors up-
holding no-strike language, striking against unfair labor practices is protected by the NLRA, and 
therefore if unions waive this right it must be clear and unambiguous in the contract); GORMAN, supra 
note 14, at 565 (explaining the Mastro Plastics holding). 
 191 See National Labor Relations Act § 7 (giving employees the right to strike). 
 192 GETMAN, supra note 173, at 137. It is not illegal for non-covered workers to try and boycott 
per se unless their contract stipulates against it, which most do, but any effort would undoubtedly be 
met with hostility and retaliation which most employees would not be willing to risk. See id. 
 193 COMPA, supra note 143, at 173. Retaliation typically takes the form of discharging but extends 
to any form of punishment. See Small Business Fact Sheet: Retaliation and Related Issues, U.S. 
EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/retaliation-factsheet.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/M39E-HNXL] (defining what retaliation is for purposes of Federal equal employ-
ment opportunity laws). 
 194 COMPA, supra note 143, at 173. 
 195 Id. at 60. While the statute does not give this right explicitly to employers, the Supreme Court 
in dicta in 1938 in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. noted that when an employer has not 
violated any right under the NLRA they should not lose the right to protect their business by hiring 
new employees to replace the strikers. See 304 U.S. 333, 345–46 (1938). This has become known as 
the Mackay doctrine. GETMAN, supra note 173, at 54–55. Some scholars, however, believe the Mac-
kay doctrine is inconsistent with the text of the NLRA, which in section thirteen tells employers they 
cannot diminish the right to strike, and by hiring workers to replace strikers they are inherently doing 
just that. National Labor Relations Act § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 163; GETMAN, supra note 173, at 54–55; see 
Getman & Kohler, supra note 101, at 13–53 (explaining the background and history of the Mackay 
case). 
 196 See COMPA, supra note 143, at 72–73 (citing U.S Departments of Labor and Commerce, 
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, Fact Finding Report (May 1994)). The 
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations’ study was conducted by Prof. Richard 
Hurd from Cornell University and issued by the “Dunlop Commission,” or the presidential commis-
sion on worker-management relations, so named for its chair John Dunlop. See id. at 72. 
2018] Who Can Unionize and Bargain? 2583 
The right to unionize has been consistently questioned and attacked by 
employers arguing that it represents an unfair and costly intrusion into their 
day to day activities by both the government and low-level employees.197 The 
Committee on Economic Development argued that by requiring collective bar-
gaining, the country has forced “wasteful litigation” onto the employer.198 An-
ti-unionization groups also object to the fact that employers with unions have 
to pay their employees at a higher than normal rate, theorizing that industries 
cannot withstand paying their employees so much.199 
By contrast, those who are pro-union explain how unions equalize the 
imbalance of power in a workplace and force democratic discussion, which 
can lead to economically favorable compromise for both parties.200 Additional-
ly, collective bargaining can be a method of setting salaries and wages without 
the need for government intervention.201 This argument has been justified be-
cause if workers and employers can regularly set wages themselves, there 
would be no need to regularly update the minimum wage for inflation.202 
Furthermore, it has been argued that unionization is a fundamental 
right.203 In fact, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights emphasized that 
“everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association” and 
“the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.”204 In 
                                                                                                                           
 197 See JAMES A. GROSS, A SHAMEFUL BUSINESS 85–89 (2010) (illustrating the inherent struggle 
between employers and employees on these issues and employers view that this is costly and broadens 
employee’s powers). It is regarded as an intrusion by the government for the simple fact that there is 
legislation requiring employers to bargain with their employees. See id. 
 198 Id. at 89–90 (quoting the Committee on Economic Development’s findings). The Committee 
on Economic Development (“CED”) is a nonpartisan nonprofit organization that sets out to research 
and analyze different economic and business issues. Steve Odland, About, COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., 
https://www.ced.org/about/letter-from-the-ceo [https://perma.cc/BBT3-EBUC] (explaining the CED’s 
mission statement). 
 199 See UnionProof, The Cost of Unionization, UNION PROOF BLOG, https://blog.unionproof.com/
the-cost-of-unionization-2/ [https://perma.cc/8ALE-XRYZ] (implying that an entire industry could 
fall because of the increase in salary they must pay to their unionized employees). The Bureau of 
Labor Statistics issued a study which found that workplaces without a union averaged $19.06 per hour 
for each employee, while those with unions paid their employees an average of $22.76 per hour, not 
including additional costs of benefits. Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of Lab., U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stat., Em-
ployer Costs for Employee Compensation—March 2009 (June 10, 2009)). 
 200 GORMAN, supra note 14, at 46. 
 201 See id. at 488 (defining collective bargaining as a way to fix labor costs without government 
intrusion). 
 202 See id. (identifying that wages are thus correctly determined by those parties involved, not the 
government). 
 203 COMPA, supra note 143, at 171; see NLRB. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 
(1937) (identifying the rights to freedom of association and self-organization in the NLRA as funda-
mental rights). 
 204 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 20, 23 (Dec. 10, 1948) 
(adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations to be a “common standard of achievement” 
of all participating nations). There is similar language in the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See COMPA, 
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domestic law, the Norris-LaGuardia Act explains it is necessary that the indi-
vidual, unorganized worker have an uninfringed right to freedom of associa-
tion.205 The usage of worker, not employee, in the statute is relevant as it im-
plies this is a broad fundamental right for all workers.206 Yet the NLRA, which 
then gives people the right to freedom of association without retaliation, says 
employee, not worker.207 Nevertheless, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., a 1937 case deciding the constitutionality of the NLRA, the Supreme 
Court noted that the rights to self-organization and collective bargaining are fun-
damental rights.208 While these rights theoretically exist for everyone in the 
United States, because of the fear of retaliation, only vaguely defined employees 
within the NLRA have the actual rights to strike and collectively bargain.209 
D. “The Bottom Line”: Is a Newsboy an Employee? 
Over a century later, the question remains—if the Newsboys of 1899 were 
around today, could they unionize as employees?210 The most obvious answer 
would be no.211 This is because the change in law to exclude independent con-
                                                                                                                           
supra note 143, at 171 (discussing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). Compare G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, 
supra at art. 20, 23 (declaring that the rights to assembly/association and the right to create “trade 
unions” are all encompassing), with G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, art. 8 (Dec. 16, 1966) (giving all people the rights to join unions without 
barrier unless such a barrier is required for democracy or safety), and G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 22 (Dec. 16, 1996) (giving all the rights to “free-
dom of association”). 
 205 See Norris-LaGuardia Act § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (restricting court action in certain labor cases 
and injunctions). The Norris-LaGuardia Act expressly lays out the policy mission of the act by saying 
“the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to 
protect his freedom of labor.” Id. Therefore, “it is necessary that [the individual unorganized worker] 
have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own 
choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment.” Id. 
 206 See id.; Worker, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining a worker as “someone 
who labors to attain an end”). In contrast, Black’s Law Dictionary defines an employee much more 
narrowly as “someone who works in the service of another person (the employer) under an express or 
implied contract of hire, under which the employer has the right to control the details of work perfor-
mance.” Employee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “employee”). 
 207 See National Labor Relations Act § 7. While the Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed before the 
NLRA, the NLRA is almost an implementation of the policy that was announced in § 2 of Norris-
LaGuardia. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Union, 325 U.S. 797, 805 (1945) (explaining that the NLRA 
codified the policy of Norris-LaGuardia); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 102, 157. 
 208 See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 33 (ruling the statute is constitutional because it 
safeguards fundamental rights). 
 209 See COMPA, supra note 143, at 172–73 (asserting America’s unionization laws are not a per se 
violation of the right to self-organize, but their exclusions make them violative of that right). 
 210 See Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. at 120 (deciding whether a Newsboy is an employee for purposes 
of unionization). 
 211 See National Labor Relations Act § 2(3); United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 256 (explaining that 
congressional reaction to Hearst Publications was hostile). 
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tractors was notably due to Congress’s disagreement with the Court’s decision 
in Hearst Publications, where the Court ruled a Newsboy was an employee 
under the NLRA.212 It is unclear, however, if Congress was rejecting the classi-
fication of the Newsboys as employees or just the broad based test the Court 
used in its analysis.213 
It is helpful to look at a more recent case example of a similar type of 
worker.214 In the D.C. Circuit in 2009 in FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB 
(“FedEx I”), the court decided whether a FedEx driver was an independent 
contractor or an employee under the NLRA.215 Like Newsboys, the FedEx 
drivers pick up their deliveries in the morning, have their routes that can theo-
retically be sold or traded, bring their own supplies to the job, and can even 
hire help.216 Certainly, FedEx drivers have less control over their days than a 
Newsboy in 1899 because they have uniforms, their vehicle must meet FedEx 
standards and display the FedEx symbol, their routes are determined by FedEx, 
and their performance is audited biyearly.217 Even so, the majority in FedEx I 
decided the proposed union was not a union of employees, but of independent 
contractors under the common law agency test.218 It stands to reason that if a 
FedEx driver who arguably had less freedom from his employer than a News-
boy could not unionize, the Newsboys would also have no rights to strike un-
                                                                                                                           
 212 United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 256; Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. at 120. 
 213 See United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 256 (holding the common law agency test, rather than the 
Hearst test, applies to determining whether someone is an employee). 
 214 See FedEx I, 563 F.3d at 495 (ruling on FedEx drivers’ petition to the Board for recognition as 
a union). 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. at 498–500. The right to sell the route is something the court focused heavily on in this 
case, but it is important to realize that the company also gives out routes for free to new contractors. 
Id. at 500 (stating they give away routes without a fee, but then arguing the fee is the service the con-
tractor is providing). The majority could only point to two instances of drivers successfully selling 
their route. Id. 
 217 Id. at 498, 500–01. The drivers can buy the car themselves and use it for their own personal 
reasons, which the court also focuses on, but the car must meet certain size, color, etc. restrictions and, 
if being used for personal reasons, all logos must be removed. Id. at 498. The dissent notes that only a 
single former driver, and none in the union in question, has ever used the FedEx truck outside of 
work. Id. at 510 (Garland, J. dissenting). 
 218 Id. at 495–96 (majority opinion). The court asserted that they used the common law test as 
prescribed by United Insurance Co. but gave an emphasis to factors that evaluated the “entrepreneuri-
alism” of the FedEx drivers. See id. at 503 (citing United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 256). The court’s em-
phasis on this factor is inconsistent with its reference to United Insurance Co., which finds the court 
cannot weigh one factor over the others. Id. at 496–97 (citing United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 258). Jus-
tice Garland in his dissent mentions that he sees no such evidence towards a trend to giving extra 
weight to entrepreneurialism, and in fact courts seem to follow the precedent set by United Insurance 
Co. that no one factor is determinative. Id. at 504 (Garland, J., dissenting) (citing United Ins. Co., 390 
U.S. at 256). Even so, when posed the same question again in another case with FedEx workers, the 
court held staunchly to their determination of the workers as independent contractors. See FedEx II, 
849 F.3d at 1128 (rejecting the argument that they did not properly consider each common law factor 
in the first FedEx case). 
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der the law today.219 If the Newsboys today could not protect themselves as 
employees with the NLRA during a unionization effort, it raises the question of 
whether our labor system has helped to protect the worker, or whether the lack 
of bargaining power makes it a broken tool in a fractured system.220 
IV. “AND THE ROAR WILL RISE FROM THE STREETS BELOW”: WHY THE 
TEST FOR EMPLOYEE HURTS THE AVERAGE AMERICAN WORKER 
When one “independent contractor” was asked by a court how often he 
works, even with the flexibility supposedly accompanying the title, he re-
sponded he worked as often “as a man has to when he has to eat,” implying he 
worked every day.221 The recent trend of misclassifications or exclusions of 
employees has led to a society where many employees reliant on their jobs for 
the basic necessities of life are missing the essential right to organize and bar-
gain with their employer without fear of retaliation.222 The right to strike has 
                                                                                                                           
 219 See FedEx I, 563 F.3d at 500–01. Under certain states’ laws, FedEx drivers have been found to 
be employees. See Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 154 Cal. App. 4th 1, 12 (Ct. App. 
2007) (ruling that under California law FedEx Drivers are employees). The court used eight factors: 
the distinct nature of the workers’ occupation, level of supervision, required skill, tool supplier, period 
of hire, method of payment, parties’ understandings, and whether the work is in the employer’s regu-
lar course of work. Id. at 10. These factors follow most of the Restatement’s factors. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (listing factors to define a “servant” to include whether the work is 
specialized, whether the worker is engaged in a “distinct occupation,” who supplies the tools, how the 
worker is paid, the employer’s general business, the parties’ intent, the employer’s normal business 
and the length of the relationship between the worker and the employer). 
 220 See COMPA, supra note 143, at 172–73 (implying that while organization is considered in 
many respects a fundamental right, the exclusions in the NLRA help to deny some those rights). It is 
important to recognize that using state law and definitions could lead to another result. See, e.g., Carey 
v. Gatehouse Media Mass. I, Inc., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 801, 806 (App. Ct. 2018) (ruling under Massa-
chusetts law that a newspaper delivery person was an employee as opposed to an independent contrac-
tor). In Massachusetts, for example, the law defines an employee using a three-pronged test. See 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 149 § 148(B) (West 2004) (defining employee for purposes of their labor 
and benefits chapters). Specifically, a worker is not an independent contractor but rather an employee 
unless the employer exhibits no control, it is not in the ordinary course of the employer’s business, 
and the worker is in an independent trade. Id. 
 221 See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 706 (1947) (quoting an employee when deciding if 
they should deem the workers as independent contractors by function of law). In Silk, the Supreme 
Court, in looking at employee under the Social Security Act, decided that although the employees did 
have control over their hours and the flexibility often afforded to independent contractors, due to eco-
nomic realities they were employees. Id. at 718. That logic has since been overturned by the courts, 
and therefore the quoted employee today would likely be deemed an independent contractor. Compare 
Silk, 331 U.S. at 706 (using the economic realities test to determine whether a worker is an employee), 
with NLRB v. United Ins. Co. 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968) (explaining that Congress passed the Taft-
Hartley act in response to the NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944) decision 
using the economic realities test for the NLRA); see also Handbook, supra note 182, § 2:15 (explain-
ing that after Hearst Publications, Congress rejected the economic-realities tests usage in the NLRA) 
(citing to Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. at 129). 
 222 See COMPA, supra note 143, at 73, 171 (explaining that unionization is a fundamental right 
and that citing the large number of workers who fear retaliation if they engage in any unionization 
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long been recognized as one of the most important tools in a union’s arsenal, 
but because of the lack of clarity in the definition of employee and the exclu-
sions in the NLRA, workers have had that tool ripped from their hands.223 To-
day, if the Newsboys united as they did in 1899, the newspapers would likely 
have been correct in their assessment that this was an illegitimate union, and 
the newspapers would have been able to legally retaliate against them.224 
This Part criticizes the current standard for who is an employee under the 
NLRA and expresses concern about the impact this has on a wide class of 
workers.225 Section A discusses the need for clarification of the test for em-
ployee.226 Section B proposes Congress amend the NLRA to allow independ-
ent contractors to have the fundamental right to unionize and strike against 
their employers.227 
A. “Something to Believe In”: The Need to Clarify the Test for Employee 
Since the congressional overhaul of the NLRA through the Taft-Hartley 
amendments in response to Hearst Publications, the test for who is an employ-
ee has remained unclear.228 This lack of clarity has left a major percentage of 
workers misclassified as independent contractors with very little legal backing 
                                                                                                                           
efforts); Katz & Krueger, supra note 16, at 1 (citing an increase in the amount of “alternative work 
arrangements,” which includes independent contractors); Weil, Why It Matters, supra note 16 (ex-
plaining that the imbalance between the worker and the employer still exists in today’s flexible work 
environment and the protection of workers should not be ignored). 
 223 See National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012) (defining “employee” for 
purposes of unionization and collective bargaining); COMPA, supra note 143, at 171 (discussing the 
various exclusions from labor law protections and how it has affected millions of workers); DAU-
SCHMIDT, CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE, supra note 105, at 506 (explaining that the right to strike 
makes employers take negotiations much more seriously). The right to strike is so powerful because 
of the severe economic ramifications from a strike. DAU-SCHMIDT, CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE, 
supra note 105, at 506. 
 224 See The Evening Journal and the Newsboys, supra note 9 (explaining the newspaper’s view 
that the Newsboys Union was not in fact a union but a boycott of independent contractors); supra 
notes 210–220 and accompanying text for why a Newsboy would likely not be an “employee” under 
the NLRA. If the strike happened today, it may look very similar to 1899, with the resistance of the 
newspapers to bargain, because no labor law exists to police either side when it is not an “employment 
relationship,” as narrowly defined. See National Labor Relations Act § 2(3) (defining employee); 
GORMAN, supra note 14, at 46 (explaining that collective bargaining is a tool that substantially reduc-
es strikes). 
 225 See infra notes 228–259 and accompanying text. 
 226 See infra notes 228–252 and accompanying text. 
 227 See infra notes 253–259 and accompanying text. 
 228 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740–42 (1989) (explaining a 
brief history of what tests the Court has used to define employee and concluding for this copyright 
issue they should use the “general common law of agency,” which is also unclear); United Ins. Co., 
390 U.S. at 256, 258; Silk, 331 U.S. at 713; Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. at 129. United Insurance Co. is 
the current standard for clarity on which test to use, a case by which its very own language states that 
there is no clear test or way to see who an employee under the NLRA is. See 390 U.S. at 258. 
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to be able to fight for their rights to unionize or strike.229 Those misclassified 
are often left without the organization and financial backing to prove their sta-
tus as employees.230 For many, it is a balancing process of whether to fight and 
possibly fail in court for the right to unionize or to just accept the misclassifi-
cation.231 Workers are essentially asked to choose if they want to be independ-
ent contractors and gain the benefits associated with that classification but give 
up various labor protections.232 While some of those benefits are enticing, be-
cause both domestic and international law has established the right to freedom 
of organization should be a protected right for all workers, this should not be a 
right they are required to give up in exchange for other benefits.233 
                                                                                                                           
 229 COMPA, supra note 143, at 171. Even if they fully had the right, because of the right of em-
ployers to hire replacement employees under the Mackay doctrine, the impact of the strike has severe-
ly withered. See GETMAN, supra note173, at 55–56 (explaining the Mackay doctrine is based on dicta 
in a case’s holding that seems to contradict the doctrine itself and this has diminished the right to 
strike). As discussed earlier, the NLRB may rule this year that misclassification itself is a violation of 
the NLRA, but that ruling would still not help to clarify the definition of employee itself. See supra 
note 142. 
 230 See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Will Hear Case on Mandatory Fees to Unions, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/us/politics/supreme-court-will-hear-case-on-
mandatory-fees-to-unions.html [https://perma.cc/LZ4M-Y9BS] (noting that unions shoulder the costs of 
collective bargaining for the entire unit). This is also a problem for organized unions in “right to work” 
states, where state law insists that an employee must agree to be in the union before they are required to 
pay dues for the union. See Dave Jamieson, Republicans Want to Pass a National Right-to-Work Law, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/republicans-pursue-national-
right-to-work-law-while-they-hold-the-reins-in-washington_us_5891fb30e4b0522c7d3e354d [https://
perma.cc/M8AA-7TUQ] (explaining that right-to-work laws allow workers to free ride the benefits of 
collective bargaining and unionization without paying dues as dues are voluntary). The Supreme 
Court just issued a decision that essentially makes all public sector employees right-to work employ-
ees, meaning they do not have to pay mandatory union fees. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & 
Mun. Emp., 138 S.Ct. 2448, 2478 (2018) (finding mandatory union fees for public sector employees a 
violation of the first amendment). This decision may have severe effects on the financial backing of 
unions. See Alana Semuels, Is This the End of Public-Sector Unions in America?, THE ATLANTIC 
(June 27, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/janus-afscme-public-sector-
unions/563879/ [https://perma.cc/6PWW-QHZB] (citing a study from the Policy Director of the Illi-
nois Economic Policy Institute, Frank Manzo, and Professor Robert Bruno of University of Illinois, 
who theorize that Janus will lead to an 8.2% decrease in union membership and funds, and may lead 
to lower pay/benefits); Dana Goldstein & Erica L. Green, What the Supreme Court’s Janus Decision 
Means for Teacher Unions, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/
us/teacher-unions-fallout-supreme-court-janus.html [https://perma.cc/MDN6-AY5G] (theorizing that 
this decision will eliminate one-third of both members and funding, specifically in teachers unions). 
 231 COMPA, supra note 143, at 182. There is evidence that employers purposely make this mis-
classification and take the risk that their employees will not want to engage in lengthy, uncertain liti-
gation to fix the determination and risk their employment and their paychecks. Id. 
 232 See Oei & Ring, supra note 16, at 1 (explaining that a worker might decide to take the tax 
benefits like the new 20% deductions associated with being an independent contractor and thus give 
up things such as labor protections). 
 233 See Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (declaring that all 
workers should have the right to full freedom of association); 26 U.S.C. § 199A (2018) (giving inde-
pendent contractors a 20% deduction on their taxes thus showing an example of the benefits of being 
an independent contractor); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 20, 23 
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Even more unsettling, the lack of clarity of the term “employee” has left 
workers in situations where sometimes they are defined as employees in spe-
cific federal legislation and not in others, with no clear indication as to which it 
is going to be.234 For example, scholars have determined that the FLSA has the 
broadest definition of employee in labor law.235 In contrast, the NLRA seem-
ingly has the narrowest definition.236 This means that workers may be eligible 
for the rights in the FLSA without the basic fundamental protection of collec-
tive bargaining.237 Truly, almost every piece of legislation defining employee 
utilizes a slightly different test to determine who is an employee, leaving em-
ployees confused about their classification and without rights in many instanc-
es.238 
                                                                                                                           
(Dec. 10, 1948) (announcing the right to freedom of association as a fundamental international right); 
COMPA, supra note 143, at 171–72 (listing the other international laws the right to organize is enu-
merated in). 
 234 See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (explaining that the 
FLSA’s definition of “employee” is more expansive than other statutes, expanding beyond the com-
mon law definition); United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362 (1945) (showing the FLSA is a 
broader definition of employee than the NLRA); Oei & Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, supra note 
137, at 1020 (explaining that the definition of employee varies in each area of the law). Going further 
than federal legislation, there are times when a worker will be an employee under state legislation and 
not federal legislation and vice versa. See, e.g., FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 504 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (FedEx I) (ruling a FedEx driver is an independent contractor under federal law); 
Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 154 Cal. App. 4th 1, 11 (Ct. App. 2007) (ruling that a 
FedEx worker is an employee under labor law). For example, in the tax world, twenty-two states use 
the “ABC” method to decide who is an employee for state unemployment taxes. Robert W. Wood, 
Defining Employees and Independent Contractors, ABA (May/June 2008), https://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2008/05/defining-employees-contractors-200805.authcheckdam.
pdf [https://perma.cc/52ZS-K5J4]. The ABC test is a three-prong test, analyzing control, scope of 
employment, and regular business of the employer. Id. The federal tax code, in comparison, uses a 
twenty-factor test weighing much more than these three elements. Id. 
 235 See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e), (g); Darden, 503 U.S. at 326; Rosenwasser, 
323 U.S. at 362 (noting that a broader definition of “employee” than the FLSA’s version likely does 
not exist); Weil, Administrator’s Interpretation, supra note 134, at 1, 3 (explaining that the FLSA’s 
definition of “employee” is broader than the common law). 
 236 See National Labor Relations Act § 2(3). Compare United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 256 (showing 
the modern interpretation of the NLRA), with Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. at 129 (representing an older 
interpretation of the NLRA where the broader economic realities test was used). 
 237 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (codifying the rights to overtime pay and minimum wage in the 
FLSA); National Labor Relations Act § 2(3) (giving employees the right to collectively bargain). In 
another similarly situated federal statute, courts have also struggled with how to define employee in 
relation to Title VII actions of discrimination and which test to use, showing yet another example of 
when an employee might be defined differently depending on the statute. See Alexander v. Rush N. 
Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that Title VII does not protect inde-
pendent contractors and outlining five factors for determining if one is an employee under Title VII). 
 238 See Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC., 106 A.3d 449, 453–62 (N.J. 2015) (walking through many of 
the different tests used and what legislation they are used under); Charles J. Muhl, What Is an Em-
ployee? The Answer Depends on the Federal Law, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 5 (2002), https://www.
bls.gov/opub/mlr/2002/01/art1full.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HXT-JEWA] (explaining the different tests 
used in different federal statutes and the confusion that causes). 
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An illustrative example of federal legislation differing on the definition of 
employee is Bankruptcy law.239 In Bankruptcy, while employee is left unde-
fined, the Code protects any independent contractor who receives seventy-five 
percent or more of its income from one employer as an employee for purposes 
of priority.240 The policy reason for this is to protect the individual worker that 
is heavily dependent on an employer for a majority of his or her income.241 
But, is that policy of protecting economically dependent workers in Bankrupt-
cy so different from the policy of giving economically dependent employees a 
right to unionize?242 
Perhaps adopting a rule for independent contractors similar to the Bank-
ruptcy system would help protect employees from misclassifications that rob 
them of their basic rights to bargaining.243 If the labor system adopted a rule 
that if an “independent contractor” gets 75% of their income from one em-
ployer, they can unionize as employees, it would better protect employees from 
misclassification and protect those without bargaining power, which is the pur-
pose of the statute.244 
Another option that could, perhaps, protect employees from misclassifica-
tion is to label misclassification as a violation of the NLRA, and therefore an 
unfair labor practice.245 This is because, by labelling employees as independent 
contractors, employees lose their rights to unionize, which is arguably a viola-
tion of the NLRAs protection of concerted activity.246 This option, which the 
NLRB is currently considering, is a step in the right direction, but perhaps not 
                                                                                                                           
 239 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2012) (dealing with the priority of unsecured claims in bankruptcy 
law and putting the claims of both employees and independent contractors who act as employees in 
one group of claimants). 
 240 See id. (giving independent contractors who make over 75% of their earnings from the debtor 
employer the same priority as a standard employee in the employer’s bankruptcy proceeding). Priority 
in bankruptcy means that the creditor will get its share of the money before those below it. See 11 
U.S.C. § 726 (codifying proper distribution of an estate’s assets). 
 241 See A. Michael Sabino & Nancy Eileen Susca, A Day’s Wages for a Day’s Work: Employment 
Claims in Bankruptcy, Protecting Debtors and Their Employees Alike, NORTON ANN. SURV. OF 
BANKR. L. (Sept. 2003) (explaining Congress intended to protect the heavily dependent worker, even 
if not an official employee). 
 242 See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (explaining that the purpose of the 
NLRA is to equalize the bargaining power for employees to protect them from economic peril). 
 243 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (showing the bankruptcy system); COMPA, supra note 143, at 171 
(noting that collective bargaining is a basic human right). 
 244 See National Labor Relations Act § 1. 
 245 See Dube & Kanu, supra note 142 (explaining the case on this issue before the NLRA and its 
suspected effects on misclassification). 
 246 See National Labor Relations Act § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (codifying the remedies for unfair 
labor practices); Velox Express, Inc., 2017 NLRB LEXIS 486, *33 (N.L.R.B. Sept. 25, 2017) (ruling 
that misclassification is a violation of § 8(2) of the NLRA as it is an effort by the employer to halt 
unionization). 
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strong enough.247 The standard remedy for an unfair labor practice is generally 
to correct the issue, but is not typically punitive, which may not be a strong 
enough deterrent for employers to resist misclassification.248 Essentially, if 
there is a borderline employee that can arguably be an independent contractor, 
an employer is likely to continue misclassifying in hopes that it can prove to 
the Board that it is an independent contractor, and even if the employer is 
wrong, there is no real punishment.249 
A better way to protect workers from misclassification, therefore, is to 
make a clear federal standard for who is an employee.250 Simply defining em-
ployee cyclically as federal law does has left much of the American workforce 
without basic rights.251 By standardizing and clarifying the definition and tests, 
the country would give clarity to workers and employees on the issue without 
requiring intrusion from the NLRB.252 
B. “The Bottom Line (Reprise)”: Why Congress Should  
Rid the NLRA of Exclusions 
After analyzing the confusion of who is an employee, the question re-
mains—why have this distinction between independent contractors and em-
ployees for unionization in the first place?253 As seen in 1899, when the News-
                                                                                                                           
 247 See Velox Express, Inc., 2018 NLRB LEXIS 92, *1 (requesting briefs for the NLRB case on 
this matter). 
 248 See National Labor Relations Act § 10; Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 12–13 
(1940) (limiting the power of the NLRB to non-punitive measures); Michael Weiner, Comment, Can 
the NLRB Deter Unfair Labor Practices? Reassessing the Punitive-Remedial Distinction in Labor 
Law Enforcement, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1579, 1579 (2005) (explaining that it is generally understood 
that the remedies for unfair labor practices do not deter employers); Nancy Schiffer, Rights Without 
Remedies: The Failure of the National Labor Relations Act, ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOY-
MENT LAW (Sept. 2008), http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/lel-annualcle/08/materials/data/papers/
153.pdf [https://perma.cc/NS4T-G6J5] (explaining that the remedies granted after a finding of an 
unfair labor practice have been weak and ineffective). Section ten of the NLRA, which covers reme-
dies, states that when there is an unfair labor practice, the Board “shall issue . . . an order requiring 
such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action 
including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this 
Act . . . .” National Labor Relations Act § 10. 
 249 See National Labor Relations Act § 10; Republic Steel Corp., 311 U.S. at 12–13 (taking puni-
tive power away from the Board); Weiner, supra note 248, at 1579 (explaining the lack of power to 
punish that the NLRB has). 
 250 See Weil, Why It Matters, supra note 16 (implying that the differences in definition statute to 
statute has complicated the problem). 
 251 See supra notes 151–170 and accompanying text for discussion for how to determine the defi-
nition of “employee.” 
 252 See COMPA, supra note 143, at 182 (explaining that employers are keen to misclassify when 
there is a gray area because they know most of their employees will not spend the money to fight it); 
Weil, Administrator’s Interpretation, supra note 134, at 3; Employee Misclassification, supra note 135 
(noting that because the definition varies depending on the law and is complex). 
 253 COMPA, supra note 143, at 171 (explaining that the right to collective bargaining and unioniza-
tion is a basic human right established in international law and signed onto by the United States). 
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boys were unable to bargain with their employer, their attempt at recognition 
through strike was followed by violence, chaos, and very little compromise.254 
On the contrary, collective bargaining forces both parties to exchange opinions 
and ideas, thereby forcing the parties to see if compromise is cheaper than bat-
tle.255 Without this right, because of unequal bargaining power, the Newsboys 
were and would be today left feeling defenseless, as are many current employ-
ees.256 
This, paired with the proposition in Hearst Publications that we should 
look to the economic realities of a person to determine if they are covered, 
leads to the notion that perhaps we should not exclude independent contractors 
from this right.257 By allowing independent contractors this right, we would be 
giving the workplace back “industrial democracy,” or the forum for bilateral 
discussion of wages and worth, as opposed to unequal rights in the work-
place.258 Workers like the Newsboys “have been down too long” and “paid 
their dues”—it is time to give them their rights and equalize bargaining power 
among all employees.259 
CONCLUSION 
The Newsboys of 1899 demonstrate a failed attempt to force their em-
ployers to collectively bargain. Never during the strike were the boys able to 
force the newspaper bigwigs to sit with them and hear them out or discuss a 
compromise. The right to unionize and strike is fundamental to the idea of de-
mocracy as it simply exists to equalize bargaining power and force the ex-
                                                                                                                           
 254 See The Evening Journal and the Newsboys, supra note 9 (stating that the Newsboys could not 
unionize because they were not employees but “merchants”); The Strike of the Newsboys, supra note 7 
(explaining that the strike was associated with attacks on scabs). The agreement to buy back papers 
can be deemed a compromise, but it was one not arbitrated by the Newsboys but unilaterally estab-
lished by the papers themselves. See The Evening Journal and the Newsboys, supra note 9 (declaring 
that this was the policy of the Journal). 
 255 GORMAN, supra note 14, at 46. Scholars observe that collective bargaining decreases the like-
lihood of strikes. Id. 
 256 See id.; Declare Newsboys’ Strike a Failure, supra note 71 (reporting that the delegation of 
Newsdealers’, formerly sympathetic towards the Newsboys, began passing out pamphlets declaring 
the strike “a failure”). Collective bargaining inherently gives employees a choice other than striking, 
which lessens the amount of strikes in the American system. GORMAN, supra note 14, at 46. 
 257 See Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. at 129 (creating the economic realities test); Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 33 (defining the right to collective bargaining and unionization as a funda-
mental right). 
 258 GORMAN, supra note 14, at 46. While independent contractors have a theoretical right to bar-
gain for the specific terms of their contract, like in the case of the Newsboys and FedEx drivers, that 
right is tangential at best because they are easily replaceable due to unequal bargaining power. See, 
e.g., Estrada, 154 Cal. App. 4th at 5 (explaining that FedEx drivers must sign non-negotiable operat-
ing agreements); NASAW, supra note 6, at 193 (1985) (explaining that the newspaper owners refused 
to meet with the Newsboys during the strike of 1899). 
 259 NEWSIES, supra note 1 (emphasis added). 
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change of ideas. That right, however, is lost to many “misclassified” employ-
ees because the law is unclear as to who is an “employee” versus who is an 
“independent contractor.” As the practice of using independent contractors as 
opposed to employees gains more speed in the economy, increasingly compa-
nies are restructuring in this fashion to avoid labor laws. To restructure the 
bargaining power and fix this issue in our economy, Congress must reanalyze 
why we exclude certain employees from having these rights. It is time to make 
news once again, “stop the world,” and fix our broken labor system. 
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